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Thirty years ago, the environmental justice movement emerged as a
powerful critique of traditional environmentalism, which had largely
ignored the distribution of environmental harms and the ways in which
those harms were concentrated on the poor and communities of color.
This Article calls for a similarly groundbreaking reimagination of both
mainstream environmental policy and environmental justice: we argue
that, to truly embrace justice, environmentalists must take account, not
only of the ways that environmental harms uniquely impact vulnerable
populations but also of the costs that environmental protection imposes
on the most vulnerable among us.
In this Article, we contend that both mainstream environmentalism
and environmental justice have taken inadequate account of the costs and
harms that environmental protection imposes on the vulnerable,
particularly the poor and communities of color. Drawing on examples from
a wide variety of contexts-from the formation of national parks, to the
protection of endangered species, to regressive environmental taxes and
regulations, to net metering policies that promote solar power-we
demonstrate that there are many instances in which environmental
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protection and social justice arguably go head-to-head rather than hand-
in-hand We suggest that environmental literature has largely ignored
these situations. Scholars have not adequately identified or theorized
principles to guide consideration or mitigation of the harms that come
when we protect an endangered species, restrict resource extraction,
designate areas with protected status, or take other steps in the name of
environmental conservation and protection.
We then make the case for pursuing what we call 'yust
environmentalism "-grappling with what procedural and distributive
justice may require when an environmental good comes at a
disproportionate cost to the poor or communities of color. We do not
advocate for less rigorous environmental protection, but for a more just
consideration of that protection's costs. The paper seeks to launch a robust
scholarly conversation about the issues it identifies and the questions it
raises, with particular focus on the ways in which just environmentalism
presents unique challenges beyond those considered by traditional
environmental justice. Wrestling with these difficult challenges is
necessary, we argue, not only for the pursuit of justice but also for
continued en vironmental progress in our deeply divided country
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1. INTRODUCTION
In April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon Well blew, setting off what
would become the largest toxic spill in history. Nearly five million barrels
of oil would ultimately make its way into the Gulf of Mexico. The oil would
spread over 68,000 square miles of ocean' and blacken more than 1,300
miles of coastline, much of that in Louisiana.2
Understandably, the spill angered the country. Louisianans felt the
impact immediately. In addition to a polluted environment, the spill
directly interfered with the ability of many to make a living. The spill
damaged marshes, mangroves, sea floors, and seashores, which meant, in
turn, that it damaged wildlife, fisheries, and sea life-such as shrimp,
crabs, and oysters-that many relied upon for food and income.
In mid-June 2010, President Obama spoke from the Oval Office and
promised the nation that he would act decisively to respond to the
1. See Elliott A. Norse & John Amos, Impacts, Perception, and Policy
Implications of the Deep water Horizon Oil and Gas Disaster 40 ENvTL. L. REP.
1058, 1065 (2010).
2. See Brian Clark Howard, BP Oil Spill Trashed More Shoreline than Scientists
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disaster.3 The following month, about 15,000 people packed into the
Cajundome on the campus of the University of Louisiana-Lafayette for
what organizers called a "Rally for Economic Survival."4 Local politicians,
including Governor Bobby Jindal, drew raucous applause as they
demanded increased consideration of the economic, rather than the
environmental, plight of Louisianans.5
Surprisingly, however, the demands for economic justice were not
made by those reliant on harvesting wildlife, fish, or shellfish. The spill had
already decimated these resources and legal action was underway. Indeed,
under pressure from the White House, British Petroleum (BP) had already
agreed to make some sort of reparations for these losses, and-given the
environmental devastation spreading in the region-reparations were the
only hope to salvage the livelihoods decimated by the spill.6
As it turned out, the demands for economic justice were not even
primarily directed at BP; instead, they were aimed at President Obama.
But why? The Obama Administration had implemented a temporary
drilling moratorium in the area to allow the government to better assess
the risk of not only the Deep Horizon Well but also thousands of other
wells-both drilled and planned-in the area. On the day of the
Cajundome rally, t-shirts, banners, and signs proclaimed "Drill Baby Drill"
and "No Moratorium."7
It is no surprise that many associate environmental protection
measures, such as the drilling moratorium, with economic consequences,
at times even dire consequences. Yet, environmentalists often resist,
ignore, or dismiss this connection, even when the economic consequences
of environmental protection are obvious and even when those
consequences fall hardest on the poor and vulnerable. While the forces
aligned with economic production and resource extraction have long
3. President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill (June 15,
2010) (transcript available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-spill-
obama-text/full-text-of-president-obamas-bp-oil-spill-speech-idUSTRE65FO
2C20100616 [https://perma.cc/7ADQ-JCDH]).
4. Associated Press, Deepwater Drilling Moratorium Targeted by Rally in









criticized environmental regulation and regulators-often strategically-
for killing jobs, those inclined to promote and defend environmental
protection have often been less willing to grapple with the connection
between the environment and the economy and, particularly, those
economic impacts of environmental protection that implicate social
justice.
While there are certainly many reasons that most environmental
literature gives short shrift to social justice when social justice goes head-
to-head with environmental protection, the most obvious reason is that,
unsurprisingly, this scholarship often incorporates a normative bias
toward environmental protection as an overriding value in the hierarchy
of values. Social justice is thus touted in the environmental justice
literature primarily when it aligns with, and serves the aims of,
environmental protection. Consider the environmental literature most
explicitly focused on the intersection of social justice and environmental
policy-the literature on environmental justice. That literature wrestles
with a wide array of important and contested issues. What harms count?8
What populations count as communities of concern? 9 And, what are the
8. See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental
Justice and Land Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 1, 11 (1998) (explaining
that in the environmental justice literature "[t]here is confusion about the
exact nature of environmental harms or burdens that are distributed
inequitably" and summarizing the literature); Michael Greenberg, Proving
Environmental Inequity in Siting Locally Unwanted Land Uses, 4 RISK: ISSUES
HEALTH & SAFETY 235, 236-38 (1993) (asserting that pertinent harms
encompass health risks, environmental contamination, property
devaluation, and social or political stresses).
9. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Analyzing Evidence of En vironmental Justice, 11 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 21 (1995) (concluding that determining vulnerability to
environmental injustice involves intersectional consideration of multiple
factors, such as class, race, and education); Anthony R. Chase, Assessing and
Addressing Problems Posed by Environmental Racism, 45 RUTGERS L. REV.
335 (1993) (discussing environmental justice through the lens of racism);
Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and
Incentives on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 32-34
(1995) (discussing environmental justice as a problem of race and economic
class); Greenberg, supra note 8 at 236-38 (asserting that vulnerable
populations include not only racial and ethnic minorities but the young and
the elderly); Robert F. Housman, The Muted Voice: The Role of Women in
Sustainable Development, 4 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 361, 365-72 (1993)
(discussing environmental harms women face in agricultural labor).
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appropriate roles of procedural justice and substantive justice?10 While
many of the most fundamental building blocks of a theory of
environmental justice remain in dispute, one issue that has received only
scant attention is what to make of the cases in which environmental
protection and social justice genuinely conflict.
In this Article, we take a hard look at those cases in which
environmental protection and social justice go head-to-head instead of
hand-in-hand. 11 Put in terms of substantive justice, we focus on the
economic externalities that society's pursuit of environmental protection
imposes on the poor and vulnerable. We argue that without full and
careful consideration of how environmental protection affects the poor
and the vulnerable, we will never be able to achieve what we call just
10. See, e.g., Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice
and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1001,
1068-84 (1993) (expanding on legislative means of achieving distributive
justice as it pertains to the placement of locally unwanted land uses); Sheila
Foster, Review Essay: Race(ial) Matters: The Quest for Environmental
Justice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 746-49 (1993) (discussing distributive
environmental justice); Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental
Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10681, 10683-702 (2000) (discussing
environmental justice according to four traditional notions of justice:
distributive justice, procedural justice, corrective justice, and social justice).
11. One might object to this framing on the grounds that environmental
protection is a necessary component of social justice and thus that
environmental protection and social justice cannot truly conflict. Of course,
environmental justice can often be usefully conceived as a subset or
component of social justice. For example, if the government shutters a highly
polluting factory in a low-income neighborhood, that action might promote
social justice by improving the residents' health; of course, it may also
impede social justice by depriving those same residents of their well-paying
jobs at the factory. In these situations, then, the tension between
environmental protection and economic concerns might well be described as
a conflict between environmental protection and other (broader) social
justice concerns. In many of our starker examples, however, the costs of
environmental protection or conservation are concentrated on the poor and
vulnerable, while the benefits to those communities of concern are
attenuated or even absent For example, the expulsion of native tribes from
newly formed national parks can hardly be said to have promoted social
justice. In such cases, it is most accurate to say that environmental




environmentalism.12 It is our hope that a more just environmentalism may
produce more enduring environmental protection measures and build a
broader-based consensus for meaningful environmental protection.
Examples of these sorts of conflicts between the environment and
social justice are familiar; indeed, these apparently zero-sum conflicts
permeate many of the most riveting narratives of environmental and
natural resource law: industries forced to shed jobs or even close their
doors when confronted with new environmental regulations; resource
extractors-loggers, irrigators, fishers-pitted against environmental and
resource protection; indigenous and other local communities restricted
from and sometimes pushed out of protected areas. Thus, we see, for
example, more stringent clean air regulations not only shuttering
inefficient plants but also putting many of their employees out of work. We
see endangered predators pitted against ranchers and river ecosystems
against farming communities. We see the protection of tropical forests,
12. While the concepts underlying what we have labeled just environmentalism
are not completely absent from the environmental literature, its presence is
spotty at best. Additionally, no other scholarly work within this literature
has conceived of this class of problems in this way. For legal literature
discussing what we conceive of as cases of just environmentalism, see
Marcilynn A. Burke, Kamath Farmers and Cappuccino Cowboys: The
Rhetoric of the Endangered Species Act and Why It (Still) Matters, 14 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 441 (2004); Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate
Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a Domestic Clean Development
Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169 (2008) (discussing domestic climate change
justice); Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of
Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279 (2003) (discussing the
clash of cultures between farmers, environmentalists, and Indians in the
Klamath Basin); Sarah Krakoff, Public Lands, Conservation, and the
Possibility of Justice, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 213 (2018) (discussing
conflicts between national park designations and tribal interests); John D.
Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics, and Federal Lands,
14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317 (1980); James R Rasband, The Rise of Urban
Archivelagoes in the American West: A New Reservation Policy? 31 ENVTL. L.
1 (2001); Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of
1906, 37 GA. L. REV. 473 (2003); Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and
Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV.
1625 (2007) [hereinafter Tsosie, Environmental Justice]; Rebecca Tsosie,
Indgenous Peoples and Epistemic Injustice: Science, Ethics, and Human
Rights, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1133 (2012); and Tim Findley, Making Monuments,
Taking Towns, RANGE (2001), http://www.rangemagazine.com/archives/
stories/summerO1/makingmonuments.htm [http://perma.cc/JD58-FSUV].
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which serve as important greenhouse gas sinks, making life more difficult
for local people, including indigenous people, who rely on accessing these
forests for food, shelter, cultural and religious traditions, and livelihoods.
To be sure, there are a great many examples of environmental
measures achieving remarkable protections and improvements for the
lives of vulnerable people. Indeed, the environmental justice movement
has made great strides in addressing the disproportionate harms that
burden society's most vulnerable. Without discounting that progress, we
assert that the work of environmental justice would be well served by
expanding the discussion of its aims to more fully anticipate and address
the negative externalities that environmental protection imposes on
vulnerable communities. Particularly when the poor or otherwise
disadvantaged bear a disproportionate share of the burdens, we hear pleas
for fairness and for a more equitable distribution of the burdens of
environmental protection: these are pleas for just environmentalism.
Confronting conflicts between environmental protection and social
justice is not comfortable or easy, but it is important. Because there has
not yet been sustained and systematic attention paid to these complex
questions, what justice means in the context of environmental protection
or natural resource preservation is an open and neglected question.
Given that environmental justice appeared first as a social movement
and only later as a field of study, it is hardly surprising that conflicts were
initially glossed over. Environmental justice's original purpose was
animated by the ennobling aim of protecting society's most vulnerable and
building empowering coalitions to achieve that aim. Those set on building
coalitions sought areas of cooperation with the environmental movement,
not conflict.
Moreover, for people who care about the environment, it is often far
more difficult to confront issues of justice in the context of environmental
protection than in the context of environmental harms. As traditionally
13. We acknowledge the economic studies that have demonstrated that
environmentally protective statutes and regulations are not net "job-killers"
and that such protective measures ultimately contribute to the overall health
and prosperity of the nation. But particular communities do sometimes bear
the brunt of job reductions and plant closures in certain regulated industries,
even if in the country as a whole, those jobs losses are offset by new jobs
related to clean-energy or other environmentally protective measures. See,






conceived, environmental justice places the environmentalist on the same
side as the poor, standing together against what are very often narrow
economic interests. Standing beside the poor and fighting against some
scheme of environmental destruction may seem intuitively right. It is
much less comfortable for environmentalists to consider what should be
done in those cases-and there are many of them-when environmental
protection creates or exacerbates negative economic and social impacts on
the vulnerable.
Even when the literature on environmental and natural resource law
focuses more explicitly on the potential conflict, such as the literature on
sustainable development, the central project is trying to find balance
between the environment on one hand, and economic development on the
other. The literature often neglects questions about the winners and losers
that striking such a balance is sure to produce. Acknowledging that there
are both costs and benefits inherent in sustainable development, we are
left with much important thinking to do about how those costs and
benefits are to be distributed. Many of the important questions that arise
resonate with the existing environmental justice literature. Whose harms
should count? What constitutes harm? What does justice look like in this
context?
The failure to recognize and account for conflicts between economic
justice and environmental protection inhibits us from finding ways to
bridge these divides. While these conflicts present difficult questions,
there are often ways to avoid conflicts or at least mitigate them. We might
find ways, for example, to allow the vulnerable who might bear losses not
only to provide input and give voice to their concerns but also to generate
possible solutions. We might develop decision-making structures designed
to respect the autonomy of those harmed or at least find potential shared
compromise. We might also find ways to craft solutions that protect the
environment while also providing remedies to the vulnerable harmed by
that protection.
In many instances, environmental protection ought to win out when
faced with competing claims of social justice, but it should not win out
without at least considering costs and harms to vulnerable communities
and without attempting to minimize and mitigate those costs. There will
also be cases in which the costs of environmental protection are simply too
high because, for example, they are disproportionately shouldered by
vulnerable communities, or come at the cost of other fundamental values,
such as the self-determination of indigenous peoples.
Thus, we believe there are cases where social justice ought to be
prioritized above environmental protection and vice-versa. Where the line
ought to be drawn and how these conflicting values ought to be weighed
9
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are difficult questions, which this paper raises in an effort to invite the
difficult conversations that must follow. Finding answers to these hard
questions is not possible until we allow ourselves to ask them.
Of course, in considering what just environmentalism ought to look
like, we do not write on a blank slate. Conflicts between economic and
environmental concerns are hardly a new challenge. Thus, we build on
work done by numerous scholars in a variety of fields who have attempted
to address these issues through a number of different frameworks. We
begin, in Part II, by providing a brief overview of the relevant literatures.
In addition to laying out major themes in the environmental justice
literature relevant to our project, we provide a cursory survey of some of
the other literatures and themes present in multiple fields that relate to
just environmentalism.
In Part III, we provide examples of just environmentalism problems. In
this Part, the examples we provide are intended to illustrate the breadth of
the challenge. To do this we draw on examples relevant to diverse parts of
the world and in a wide range of policy areas. We also attempt to
categorize some of the types of issues that frequently arise.
After addressing the scope and variety of just environmentalism
problems, in Part IV we make the normative argument that we ought to
consider and often address social justice concerns that result from
environmental protection. This Part evaluates the reasons that just
environmentalism deserves our attention. In addition to ethical
arguments, we consider the practical politics of pursuing environmental
progress. We also address potential objections to just environmentalism.
Building on the assessment that just environmentalism is a challenge
worth pursuing, in Part V, we lay out some of the most central questions
facing us if we seriously pursue just environmentalism. Given the
significant shift it will take to truly tackle the social justice implications of
environmental protection, this Part is designed primarily to launch the
conversations that need to occur. We include observations, raise
questions, consider some preliminary applications of just
environmentalism, and identify potential stumbling blocks.
In Part VI, we conclude.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND RELATED LITERATURES AND THEMES
In this Part, we begin with the literature on environmental justice.
Here, we lay out some of the major questions explored in the
environmental justice literature and discuss how our project fits within
and extends that literature. We also provide a brief overview of other




part, with the disproportionate burdens that environmental protection
may impose on the vulnerable. These include sustainable development,
just transition, the commons, and the environment and the poor.
A. Relevant Themes in the Environmentalfustice Literature
Environmental justice is the marriage of the environmental ethic and
social justice; it lives at the intersection of environmental and social justice
concerns and embodies the simultaneous pursuit of both social justice and
environmental protection. Traditionally, environmental justice focuses on
the costs that environmental pollution and degradation impose on the
most vulnerable among us-the poor and communities of color. Born first
as a social movement, environmental justice later grew into an area of
robust academic inquiry.14
While Professor Jedediah Purdy has persuasively argued that the
connection between social justice and environmental protection has had a
storied past extending well beyond when most came to see it as a social
movement,' 5 the connections between social justice and environmental
protections began to receive much more sustained attention from social
14. This is not to say that the idea of pursuing environmental protection along
with social justice had never occurred to anyone, just that it did not become
a field of study until after it appeared and made headway as a social
movement Many of those who contributed to the literature, particularly
early on, are those who helped further the social movement
15. See Jedediah Purdy, Environmentalism Was Once a Social-justice Movement:
It Can Be Again, ATLANTIC (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/
science/archive/2016/12/how-the-environmental-movement-can-recover-
its-soul/509831 [http://perma.cc/W5DT-5SBU]. In his essay, Professor
Purdy urges the post-1970s environmental movement-what
environmental justice advocates call "mainstream environmentalism"-to
embrace its roots in an older, "long environmental-justice movement," in
which "for more than a century, activists and scholars have been engaging
the themes of fairness, inequality, and political and economic power in the
human environment" Id. He contends that "[f]or decades, environmentalism
and what we now call environmental justice were deeply intertwined. Care
for the earth and for vulnerable human communities belonged together.
Empowering workers, protecting public health, and preserving landscapes
were part of a single effort." Id. Purdy concludes with a call to action: "Maybe
it's time to reclaim that older environmental movement, and see that it was
an environmental-justice movement all along." Id.
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and environmental advocates beginning in the 1980s. At that time, the
United Church of Christ published a report that highlighted the connection
between race and the siting of toxic waste landfills.'" The report itself
grew out of a losing battle of community organizers in Warren County,
North Carolina (a poor, black community), to stop the construction of
landfills to hold polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). As more and more
communities of color began to confront similar conditions in their own
neighborhoods, the environmental justice movement took shape as a
"loosely connected" network of "hundreds of grassroots organizations"
challenging the "unequal exposure to ecological hazards" that "[p]lagu[es]
people of color where they 'work, live, and play."""
Since that time, environmental justice has become a mainstay in
discussions about environmental policy. It has been the subject of a long-
standing presidential executive order,' 9 numerous lawsuits,2 0 the work of
16. Comm'n for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States: A
National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of
Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites, UNITED CHURCH CHRIST (1987),
http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfrontnet/unitedchurchofchrist/legacy-url/1
3567/toxwrace87.pdf [http://perma.cc/6Q5H-SZYD].
17. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NOT IN MY BACKYARD: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,898 AND
TITLE VI AS TOOLS FOR ACHIEVING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, 13-14 (Oct. 2003),
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/envjust/ej0104.pdf [http://perma.cc/37MT-X4
GN].
18. Daniel Faber, A More P'roductive'Environmentallustice Politics: Movement
Alliances in Massachusetts for Clean Production and Regional Equity in
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE SOCIAL JUSTICE CHALLENGE TO
THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 135, 135 (Ronald Sandler & Phaedra C.
Pezzullo eds., 2007) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND
ENVIRONMENTALISM]. More specifically, the movement focused on "(1) higher
concentrations of destructive mining operations, polluting industrial
facilities and power plants; (2) greater presence of toxic waste sites and
disposal/treatment facilities, including landfills, incinerators, and trash
transfer stations; (3) severe occupational and residential health risks from
pesticides, lead paint radiation waste, and other dangerous substances; and
(4) lower rates of clean-up and environmental enforcement of existing laws."
Id.
19. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg, 7,629 (Feb. 16, 1994) (requiring that
each federal agency "make achieving environmental justice part of its





community activists and nonprofit organizations, and a substantial body of
scholarship. The environmental justice movement has made major strides
in exposing the myriad ways in which poor communities and communities
of color have borne a shockingly disproportionate burden of the harms
generated by environmental destruction. From the concentration of dirty
power plants and toxic waste dumps in low-income communities to the
vulnerability of many tribal communities and low-income communities of
color to the devastating effects of sea level rise and other consequences of
climate change, environmental justice has focused our attention on how
the environmental costs of economic expansion have been externalized to,
and concentrated on, the socially disadvantaged. Environmental justice
has helped to identify and to address many of these stark inequities.
While many within the environmental movement have embraced the
notion of environmental justice, most of the basic premises of
environmental justice are areas of inquiry and dispute. Environmental
theorists and scholars grapple with profound questions including whether
and to what extent justice in this context is distributive (e.g., a community
bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of undesirable
development);2 1 whether and to what extent justice amounts to
20. See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher, A Neighborhood of Oil Pits Death, WASH. POST
(May 1, 1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/
05/01/a-neighborhood-of-oil-pits-death/8d5dal5f-f049-4666-bf3O-5ca079
af89ac [http://perma.cc/464A-ENDA] (describing cases alleging
"environmental racism," including the "first environmental racism suit...
filed in Houston in 1979 by residents of a predominantly black
neighborhood trying to block a new landfill" and a later suit brought by
residents of Kennedy Heights, Texas, against Chevron alleging that its
predecessor company specifically marketed land it knew was contaminated
to African-American home buyers); Sam Howe Verhovek, Racial Rift Slows
Suit for "Environmental justice," N.Y. TIMES (Sept 7, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/07/us/racial-rift-slows-suit-for-enviro
nmental-justice.html [http://perma.cc/77EZ-ZZTS] (detailing the Kennedy
Heights case); see also Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor v. Jackson, 922 F. Supp.
2d 1057, 1060 (E.D. Cal. 2013), affdsub nom., Padres Hacia Una Vida Major
v. McCarthy, 614 F. App'x 895 (9th Cir. 2015) (attempting to compel the EPA
to act on a Title VI complaint that California agencies were discriminating
against poor Latino communities in the siting of toxic waste disposal
dumps).
21. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 16, 1994) ("To the
greatest extent practicable and permitted by law... each Federal agency
shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying
13
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procedural protection (e.g., increased transparency and participation); 2 2
which communities count as communities of concern (e.g., the poor or
racial minorities); 2 3 what counts as harm (e.g., siting of undesirable land
uses, distribution of risk, or distribution of environmental amenities like
parks);2 ' and why distributional inequities come about (e.g., racial animus,
markets, political institutions working for some interests and not others,
or desire for economic growth in distressed communities).25
Despite the wide range of disputed questions within the
environmental justice literature, one potential facet of environmental
justice that has received much less attention is the one we now explicitly
explore: how to address the disproportionate harms that environmental
protection-rather than environmental degradation-imposes on
vulnerable communities. 26  Indeed, much of the literature on
environmental justice assumes-often explicitly-that environmental
and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on
minority populations and low-income populations in the United States....").
22. See Sheila Foster, justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities,
Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental
justice Movement 86 CALIF. L. REV. 775, 828-33 (1998).
23. See David Naguib Pellow & Robert J. Brulle, Power, Justice, and the
Environment: Toward Critical Environmental Justice Studies, in POWER,
JUSTICE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 13 (David Naguib Pellow & Robert J. Brulle
eds., 2005).
24. See Jennifer R. Wolch et al., Urban Green Space, Public Health, and
Environmental justice: The Challenge of Making Cities '7ust Green Enough,"
125 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 234, 234-244 (2014).
25. See Foster, supra note 22, at 791-807.
26. Similarly, most working definitions and applications of environmental
justice focus solely on the harms of environmental degradation. The EPA, for
example, defines environmental justice as "the fair treatment and
meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national
origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation and
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies." Learn About
Environmental Justice, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
environmentaljustice/learn-about-environmental-justice [http://perma.cc/
2FXV-N3PQ]. The definition goes on to explain that "[f]air treatment means
no group of people should bear a disproportionate share of the negative
environmental consequences resulting from industrial, governmental and




justice involves issues in which environmental protection necessarily
advances, rather than potentially impedes, social justice goals.27 Certainly,
one can find early environmental justice advocates who focused explicitly
on these potential conflicts, 28 as well as echoes of those early strains in
later environmental justice scholarship 29 and ongoing grassroots activism.
Additionally, there are a number of scholars who have focused on conflicts
between social justice and environmental protection in a number of
individual contexts," particularly in the arena of climate change justice,'
27. For example, Jedediah Purdy identifies three major criticisms that
"environmental justice scholars and advocates" level against "what they call
mainstream environmental law": the movement's inattention to the
distribution of "environmental harms and benefits," the movement's focus
on preserving the "beautiful outdoors," rather than the workplace and urban
areas where most people-especially the poor-spend their days, and the
movement's emphasis on "elite forms of advocacy, like litigation and high-
level lobbying" rather than on "popular engagement" Purdy, supra note 15.
Notably absent from this summary of environmental justice critiques of
mainstream environmentalism is any mention of addressing potential
conflicts between social justice and environmental concerns.
28. For example, in 1970, early "eco-justice" advocate Norman Faramelli argued:
"Most of the solutions suggested for environmental quality will have, directly
or indirectly, adverse effects on the poor and lower income groups." Peter
Wenz, Does Environmentalism Promote Injustice for the Poor., in
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 18, at 57, 59
(quoting Norman Faramelli). By way of explication, Faramelli noted that "[i]f
the cost of pollution control is passed directly on to the consumer on all
items, low income families will be affected disproportionately" and "[i]f new
technologies cannot solve the environmental crisis and a slowdown in
material production is demanded, the low income families will again bear
the brunt of it, as more and more of them will join the ranks of the
unemployed." Id.
29. See, e.g., Tsosie, Environmental Justice, supra note 12, at 1628-30 (tracing
the history of the environmental justice movement's relationship to tribes
and arguing for a more comprehensive conception of environmental justice
that values tribal self-determination to enable tribal autonomy and
governance over economic and environmental choices); see also Sarah
Krakoff, Tribal Sovereignty and EnvironmentalJustice, inJUSTICE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATIONS 161, 163 (Kathryn M. Mutz
et al. eds., 2002).
30. See sources cited supra note 12. In particular, Professor Tsosie argues in
Environmental justice that environmental justice has taken a profoundly
insufficient view of what justice means in the context of indigenous peoples
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discussed more fully in Subsection II.B.1.b. These efforts, however, have
typically been limited to specific contexts and have not tried to generalize
their observations or conceptualize more broadly what justice-or
environmental justice-means when social justice and environmentalism
conflict.
Even Purdy's recent thoughtful and impassioned plea for mainstream
environmentalism to go the distance in embracing environmental justice
focuses on areas of potential agreement and synergy between protecting
the environment and furthering social justice-on expanding
environmental advocacy to include, once again, the built environment and
workplace toxic exposure and on promoting "[a]ggressive enforcement of
anti-pollution law against facilities" that "expose[] people living nearby to
a bunch of hazardous pollutants."3 2 The conspicuous lack of discussion of
any potential conflict suggests that both environmental justice and
mainstream environmentalism continue to overlook those situations in
which social justice and environmentalism go head-to-head instead of
hand-in-hand.
One thing is clear: to fully embrace Purdy's call to treat "[e]conomic
power, racial inequality, and the struggles of indigenous peoples" as the
and the catastrophic consequences of climate change. Tsosie, Environmental
Justice, supra note 12, at 1675-77.
31. See, e.g., Burkett, supra note 12; Tsosie, Environmental Justice, supra note
12.
32. Purdy, supra note 15.
33. Those who view traditional environmental justice as focused on both the
harms of environmental degradation and the harms of environmental
protection could conceive of our project as an exploration of how the larger,
mainstream environmental movement might integrate this more expansive
notion of environmental justice, rather than mainstreaming only those
environmental justice concerns in which social justice and environmental
protection are not in tension. (Certainly, mainstream environmentalism-
including most advocacy groups, scholars, and the EPA-view
environmental justice as focused only on harms caused by environmental
degradation.) Refraining our arguments in this way would change little in
our analysis. Nevertheless, it is important to note that for congision and
consistency, throughout this Article, we use the shorthand "traditional
environmental justice" to refer to environmental justice claims that arise
only out of the harms of environmental degradation and use "just
environmentalism" to refer to the expansion of these justice concerns to the




"heart" of the environment movement will require us to grapple more fully
with those situations in which important social justice values and
environmental protection and conservation diverge.34 So even as many of
the major questions and themes of the environmental justice literature
resonate with the challenges we examine in this Article, the literature on
environmental justice-as rich as it is-requires extension, adjustments,
and perhaps some reimagining to account for situations in which
environmental protection and justice stand, if not in opposition, at least in
tension.
B. Relevant Thematic Insights from Allied Literatures
Of course, it is no surprise that there are many instances in which
environmental protection and social justice do not necessarily go hand-in-
hand. Many literatures allied with the environmental justice literature
have identified the possibility of conflict between protecting the
environment and protecting society's most vulnerable. While these
literatures often stop short of fully counting and grappling with the
potential costs of environmental protection for the lives and livelihoods of
the vulnerable, they nonetheless suggest some important insights-
including potential pitfalls and stumbling blocks-for conceptualizing a
more just environmentalism.
1. Sustainable Development, Climate Change Justice, and Other
Emerging International Law Norms
a. Sustainable Development
Sustainable development focuses on three basic policy realms-
"economy, environment, and equity"-and "projects them over the present
and future time scales."3 5 In particular, sustainable development seeks to
find a balance between environmental protection, on the one hand, and
economic development, on the other. It recognizes both the importance of
economic growth, particularly for those in developing countries, and the
importance of managing that growth to reduce harm to, if not enhance, the
natural environment. Moreover, it proceeds on the assumption that
34. Purdy, supra note 15.
35. J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for
Environmental Law 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 39 (1999).
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countries unable to develop in the age of relatively unchecked pollution
should not be held back in the age of environmental protection and that
poverty itself is prone to ravage the environment.
Despite this nod to equity across countries, equity in the sustainable
development context is understood primarily in intergenerational terms:
"development that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."3 Importantly
for our purposes, the sustainable development movement asks us to stay
our hand and temper short-term gains, but it does not provide much
guidance about who should bear the short-term losses that balancing
development with environmental protection will almost certainly entail.37
36. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development Our
Common Future, WORLD COMM'N ON ENVT & DEv. 43, http://www.un-
documents.net/our-common-future.pdf [http://perma.cc/K6P4-CXC4]; see
also id at 46 (describing "a process of change in which the exploitation of
resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological
development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both
current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations"); U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I),
Princ. 3 (Aug. 12, 1992), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl51/
aconfl5126-lannexl.htm [http://perma.cc/JUD2-NUFS] ("The right to
development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and
environmental needs of present and future generations."). Sustainable
development takes a long-term view that recognizes that preserving the
natural environment is not only critical for quality of life, both now and into
the future, but also that the resources we preserve may play a critical role in
future economic development Accordingly, sustainable development is
interested not only in finding a balance between current development and
protection of the environment but also between the current generation and
those generations yet to come.
37. Indeed, one of the most common critiques of sustainable development is that
it lacks well-defined, concrete content and thus is susceptible to multiple,
conflicting interpretations by different interest groups. See, e.g., M. Nils
Peterson et al., Moving Toward Sustainability Integrating Socal Practice and
Material Process, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note
18, at 189, 192. In some contexts, agreement on sustainable development
masks deep divides about both appropriate policies and the values that
inform those policies. See id at 192 ("Multiple meanings evolved as
sustainability advocates rooted the concept in their personal moral





While the general outlook of sustainable development might give us a
place to start the conversation, it does not provide us a very clear sense
about where the conversation will take us.
b. International Environmental Justice and Climate Change
Justice
The developing international norms of climate change justice are some
of the first to recognize the injustice of climate change measures-whether
adaptation or mitigation-that exacerbate the plight of the poor and
otherwise vulnerable.
More generally, environmental justice at the international scale seems
to pay more attention to the disproportionate burdens of environmental
protection imposed on the poor than domestic environmental justice.
Perhaps this is because, in many respects, international environmental
justice emerged "as the developing world's answer to the industrialized
world's growing concern to preserve environmental goods such as species
and ecosystems, many of which exist primarily in developing countries." 39
Thus, international environmental justice was rooted largely in the
burdens that the Global North's appetite for environmental protection
imposed on the poor in the Global South. It resonated with the critiques of
"eco-imperialism" or "environmental-imperialism," which asserted that
the "wealthy, developed countries of the North," having despoiled and
38. See, e.g., W. Neil Adger et al., TowardJusdce in Adaptation to Climate Change,
in FAIRNESS IN ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 4 (W. Neil Adger et al. eds.,
2006) (arguing that "actions taken to adapt to climate change can
themselves have important justice implications because their benefits and
costs are frequently distributed in ways that consolidate or exacerbate
current vulnerabilities rather than reduce them" and proposing different
principles of justice that might suggest how burdens should be distributed);
Stephen H. Schneider & Janica Lane, Dangers and Thresholds in Climate
Change and the Implications forJustice, in FAIRNESS IN ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, supra, 23, 42-43 (noting that while "participation by the developing
world in [green-house gas emission] mitigation is essential," the "common,
but differentiated responsibilities" for mitigation costs adopted by
international climate agreements reflects the view that developing countries
should bear less mitigation costs than the developed countries who have
contributed most to climate change).
39. Dale Jamieson, justice: The Heart of Environmentalism, in ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE & ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 18, at 85, 90.
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exploited their own resources to build a foundation of wealth, were using
tools like trade policy to "impose their environmental preferences and
priorities on the poor, developing countries of the South."40 And, while
international environmental justice has been invoked in a wide range of
issues, perhaps its most visible application today is in "climate change"
justice,4 1 which from its inception has been concerned not only with the
disproportionate harms that climate change will inflict on the poor but
also with the disproportionate economic harms that less developed
countries may suffer if climate change mitigation regimes require them to
restrict their use of fossil fuels. 42
In contrast, domestic environmental justice grew out of the siting of
polluting factories and waste disposal facilities-environmental hazards-
in poor and minority neighborhoods and thus was focused primarily on
the unjust distribution of the harms of environmental degradation.
Concerns for environmental protection's potential harm to economic
interests might also have a stronger voice in the international context
because those concerns were voiced by countries with a seat at the
negotiating table, even if poorer countries' views were sometimes less
influential.4 3 Domestically, vulnerable communities have been excluded
40. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism: An Environmental Justice
Critique ofFree Trade, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 980 (2001) (proposing that
"environmental imperialism" be reconceptualized as "the North's systematic
and ongoing appropriation of the South's ecological resources").
41. Some scholars, including Maxine Burkett, have argued for the application of
climate justice principles domestically, as well. See Burkett, supra note 12.
42. The relationship between climate justice and environmental justice can be
conceptualized in a number of ways. For some, climate justice is simply
"environmental justice on the issue of climate change," J. Timmons Roberts,
Globalizing Environmental Justice, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE &
ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 18, at 285, 294, or a "sub-discipline of
environmental justice," Burkett, supra note 12, at 192, while for others
climate justice arguably represents something more transformative: the
"next generation of environmental justice theory and action," seeid. (quoting
Pellow & Brulle, supra note 23).
43. Potential explanations for why just environmentalism has gotten more
attention in the international context are explored more fully in Section V.D,
infra. The international community has likewise led on the rights of
indigenous peoples in a way that has outpaced domestic vindication of those
rights. When the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was




from the negotiating tables where the distribution of protections as well as
the allocation of harms have been decided. Consequently, domestic just
environmentalism potentially has much to learn from international
environmental norms both about recognizing the unfair distribution of the
costs of environmental protection and about the importance of voice and
participation in developing just environmental policy.
c. Other Emerging International Law Norms
Another important and relevant principle of international
environmental law is the concept of "common but differentiated
responsibilities" (CBDR). This principle was first formally recognized in
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development generated at the
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. The
basic idea of CBDR is that all countries should protect the global
environment-"the common heritage of mankind"-but that richer
countries that have inflicted more harm on the global ecosystem and have
more resources have a greater obligation to pay for preventive and
remedial action.
CBDR was explicitly adopted as Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration 4 4
and has since exerted a strong influence on the direction of international
environmental law. More specifically, CBDR has become an important part
of international climate change agreements, including the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. The
principle has been a point of contention, particularly for the United States,
United Nations, with only four votes against, those coming from the United
States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. See UN HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF
HIGH COMM'R, THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES: A MANUAL FOR NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, at vi n.5 (2013),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IPeoples/UNDRIPManualForNH
RIs.pdf, [http://perma.cc/56V6-E6PS].
44. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 36 ("States
shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and
restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the
different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have
common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of
sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the
global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they
command.").
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and in the 2015 Paris Agreement it was amended to "common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of
different national circumstances." 4 5 Nonetheless, CBDR suggests that
justice requires attention to responsibility and resources: both
responsibility for harm and the distribution of available resources for
mitigating and responding to that harm matter.
Other international norms also address potential conflicts between
economic interests and the environment. Intergenerational equity might
be viewed as a weak norm, but a strong argument in favor of sustainable
economic development and natural resource use.46 Some other
international norms focus more explicitly on the costs environmental
protection may impose on the poor. For example, many international
treaties and organizations require protections for the poor when
addressing natural resource protection. 4 7 In addition, particular
substantive and procedural norms with regard to the rights of.indigenous
peoples are enshrined in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples adopted in 2007, including a right to meaningful
consultation with governments before adoption of measures that may
affect them.4 8
2. Just Transition
To date, "just transition" is more of an advocacy position informed by
environmental justice and climate change justice than a separate, well-
developed scholarly concept.49 Nonetheless, its consideration here is
45. U.N. Conference of the Parties, Adoption of the Paris Agreemen4 U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, art. 4.3 (Dec. 12, 2015), http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/lOaOl.pdf [http://perma.cc/39H6-Z9VP].
46. See, e.g., WALTER F. BABER & ROBERT V. BARTLETT, CONSENSUS AND GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 44 (2015).
47. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, Resolving Conflicts Between Human Rights and
Environmental Protection, in HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PLACE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 206, 209 (Erika De Wet & Jure Vidmar eds., 2012) (describing
International Whaling Convention exception for subsistence hunting).
48. See G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, at Art.
19 (Sept. 13, 2007).
49. The law review literature on just transition, for example, is relatively sparse,
although there are a few articles that consider it. See, e.g., J. Mihn Cha, Labor




important because it is one of the relatively rare principles that focuses
explicitly and exclusively on a fair distribution of the burdens of
environmental protection-in particular, the burdens of transitioning
away from a fossil fuel energy economy to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions.
Some twenty years ago, a coalition of U.S. environmental and climate
justice groups-the Environmental justice and Climate Change Initiative-
set forth "10 Principles for Just Climate Change Policies in the U.S."50 The
Initiative's third principle focuses on "ensur[ing] just transition for
workers and communities."51 In particular, it argues that "[n]o group
should have to shoulder alone the burdens caused by the transition from a
fossil fuel-based economy to a renewable energy-based economy."52
Accordingly, "a just transition would create opportunities for displaced
workers and communities to participate in the new economic order
through compensation for job loss, loss of tax base, and other negative
effects."53 Subsequently, a wide variety of climate change justice groups
have endorsed and advocated for a just transition, 54 and just transition is
also mentioned in the preamble of the historic Paris climate agreement
negotiated in December 2015.ss Just transition has likewise been an
important component of labor union advocacy.
A more fully theorized and fleshed-out version of "just transition"
might ultimately be an important building block (or subset) of just
Rising Sea Levels in New York State, 34 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 423, 445 (2017);
Alan Ramo & Deborah Behles, Transitioning a CommunityAwayfrom Fossil-
Fuel Generation to a Green Economy. An Approach Using State Utility
Commission Authority, 15 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 505 (2014).
50. See Roberts, supra note 42, at 295.




54. See TRACEY SIGLLINGTON, CLIMATE JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 75 (2016).
55. See U.N. Conference of the Parties, Adoption of the Paris Agreement,
Proposal of the Presidentat 21, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12,
2015), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/109r01.pdf, [http:
//perma.cc/3QAF-V6SL] ("The Parties to this Agreement... Taking into
accountthe imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation
of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined
development priorities....")
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environmentalism. Just transition does not, however, speak to the full
range of issues that just environmentalism implicates as not every issue
can be framed as a transition to some agreed upon "better world" that
imposes essentially "temporary" dislocation costs on certain groups. At the
very least, just environmentalism requires us to think more carefully about
what we are transitioning to-for example, whether a transition to
national parks purged of indigenous cultures and peoples can ever be truly
just.
3. The Commons
The literature on the commons focuses primarily on the classic
commons problem-the tragedy of the commons, in which open-access
resources are overused as self-interest pushes toward use even as a
diffuse collective interest pushes toward conservation.s6 Much commons
scholarship builds on Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom's principles of
long enduring institutions, which try to derive general observations from
case studies about why some communities succeed in avoiding the tragedy
of the commons while others succumb.s?
56. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968). Though
not as relevant to this Article, we note that another branch of the commons
literature looks at the benefits created by using the commons. Carol Rose's
seminal article, The Comedy ofthe Commons, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986), in
many ways sits at the heart of this branch. Other kinds of commons
problems relate to how to inspire collective action, how to thwart free riding,
and how multiple uses of resources often conflict with each other.
57. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 88-102 (1990). Ostrom's
principles have been developed and refined by a number of other important
works. See, e.g., JEAN-MARIE BALAND & JEAN-PHILIPPE PLATEAU, HALTING
DEGRADATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: Is THERE A ROLE FOR RURAL COMMUNITIES?
243-45 (1996); ROBERT WADE, VILLAGE REPUBLICS: THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION IN INDIA 215-16 (1988); Arun Agrawal, Common Property
Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources, 29 WORLD DEV. 1649,
1654 (2001); Michael Cox et al., A Review of Design Principles for
Community-Based Natural Resource Management, 15 ECOLOGY & Soc'Y 38
(2010); Margaret A. McKean, Success on the Commons: A Comparative
Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource Management 4




This literature often focuses on poor communities, demonstrating how
the commons often serve as a refuge for the poor58 and exploring the
ingenuity of the ordinary, often-poor people who find ways to cooperate
and make life on the commons work.
Nonetheless, while the commons literature at least implicitly calls for a
balanced approach to resource use, it does not provide much insight into
how to approach those situations in which we have to choose between
environmental protection and the livelihoods of resource users. Indeed,
while the literature has done a great deal in helping make headway in
identifying, diagnosing, and even solving commons resource problems, the
same literature has been criticized (even by scholars working on it) for
paying too little attention to socio-economic impacts of commons
management.5 9 This seems to be a fair criticism: beyond the insights of
resource management, which often helps the poor and does so by design,
the literature does not have a tradition of focusing on social equity.
Despite having contributed to the long-term management of resources
on which the poor are often reliant, other than expressing a desire for
balance, this literature does not tell us how-when tradeoffs need to be
made-to weigh environmental protection on the one hand against the
livelihoods of resource users on the other.
58. See Kanchan Chopra & Purnamita Dasgupta, Common Pool Resources and




59. See, e.g., Arun Agrawal, Studying the Commons, Governing Common-Pool
Resource Outcomes, 36 ENVTL. SCI. & POL'Y 86, 89 (2013) ("If it is necessary to
distinguish between the many different outcomes of the governance of
common-pool resource systems-among them, livelihoods benefits from the
resource, equity in the distribution of benefits, diversity of biological
systems, and long-term sustainability of the resource system-and that
these outcomes may not be tightly correlated, then the task facing scholars
of commons is only starting."); Arun Agrawal & Catherine Shannon Benson,
Common Property Theory and Resource Governance Institutions:
Strengthening Explanations of Multiple Outcomes, 38 ENvTL. CONSERVATION
199 (2011).
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III. JUST ENVIRONMENTAL CASE STUDIES
Situations in which environmental protection imposes
disproportionate costs on the poor and vulnerable are both very common
and very diverse. This Part provides a representative sampling of the kinds
of conflicts that can arise, including cases more commonly associated with
natural resource conservation and others more commonly associated with
pollution mitigation and abatement. We provide these examples both to
illustrate the breadth of topics where we might find environmental
protection and social justice in tension and also to sketch out categories of
these sorts of problems. Our examples sort into three broad categories:
harms related to environmental conservation; job losses related to
pollution-control regulation; and regressive environmental taxes,
subsidies, and mandates that burden the poor. In subsequent Parts, we
provide an argument about why we ought to care about the sorts of
problems we identify here and what might be done about them.
A. Environmental Conservation: Protected Areas and Habitat
To the extent that people are dependent on land, it is not just the
destruction of it that deprives people-so might the protection of it when
protection means less use of it.6 0
1. Protected Areas
Many of the beginning chapters of national park management in the
United States revolve around setting up park concessions and evicting
Native Americans who had used and managed the lands for millennia.
Professor Sarah Krakoff has recently identified this "divest[ing] of [Tribal]
lands and cultural heritage in the name of preserving these resources for
others" as "the dark side of conservation history."6 1 The idea propagated
60. As Professor Rebecca Tsosie argues, this principle may apply with particular
force where the ties to land encompass tradition, culture, spirituality, and
identity, as it does for many indigenous peoples. She argues that an
adaptation strategy in response to climate change that includes removal of
indigenous groups may prove "genocidal" for such indigenous groups.
Tsosie, Environmental Justice, supra note 12, at 1625.




by John Muir of park resources being unspoiled wilderness required
elimination of human presence to create an illusion of the pristine.6 2
For example, in the 1870s, in events foreshadowing the formation of
other national parks, the United States Government forcibly evicted Native
Americans from Yellowstone National Park in the name of environmental
conservation. Despite thousands of years of Native Peoples in the area
utilizing, managing, and sharing the region's resources, the legal
protections of a park designation were deemed preferable and the
presence of native inhabitants was deemed an incompatible use. Many of
the tribes from the region traditionally used the area for purposes ranging
from ceremonial to sustainable resource extraction such as gathering
foodstuffs, medicinal plants, and materials essential for tools.6 3 The federal
government cut off access to these vital resources when it removed the
park's traditional native occupants and imposed a restrictive scheme on
the use of the land, all without consultation or consideration of the costs
for the indigenous peoples of the region. In an ironic twist, visitors to
Yellowstone National Park can still see today the park offices and housing
in Mammoth Hot Springs that once were military barracks built to
promote and protect that illusion of unspoiled wilderness. 64 The soldiers
housed in those barracks were charged with keeping native peoples out of
Yellowstone,65 and they frequently removed members of the twenty-six
tribes with a presence in the area, including Shoshone, Sheep Eater, Crow,
and Bannock peoples, from the park.6 6
Similarly, while members of the Blackfeet tribe were originally
allowed to remain in Glacier National Park, in 1912, members of the Tribe
were arrested for exercising their treaty rights to hunt and fish in the area,
and the Park Service ultimately determined it would eject the members of
the Tribe.67 Similar stories stain the founding of many U.S. national parks,
including the Grand Canyon, Yosemite, and Zion.
62. See, e.g., id at 21.
63. See MARK DAVID SPENCE, DISPOSSESSING THE WILDERNESS: INDIAN REMOVAL AND THE
MAKING OF THE NATIONAL PARKS 56-59 (1999); see generally Krakoff, supra
note 12, at 21-22.
64. See SPENCE, supra note 63, at 56-59.
65. See id.; see also Krakoff, supra note 12, at 22-23.
66. Id.
67. See ROBERT H. KELLER & MICHAEL F. TUREK, AMERICAN INDIANS AND NATIONAL
PARKS 52 (1998); Isaac Kantor, Ethnic Cleansing and America's Creation of
NationalParks, 28 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv.41, 52 (2007).
27
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Moreover, this restriction of tribal treaty rights in the name of
conservation is hardly a relic of a benighted past. In April 2016, a member
of the Crow Tribe of Montana was convicted of poaching an elk within the
boundaries of the Bighorn National Forest.66 He asserts that he was within
the Crow Reservation boundary in Montana, which abuts the
Montana/Wyoming state line. Wyoming game wardens asserted that he
had wandered across the state line where he took an elk.69 He is currently
seeking review of his conviction from the Supreme Court, arguing that the
1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie protects the right of Crow tribal members to
hunt in the area, even on the Wyoming side of the line.
Even though the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples articulates a right to "the free, prior and informed
consent" of indigenous peoples before removal, with compensation and an
option to return," we also find other recent stories from across the globe.
Tanzania has evicted the Maasai out of Ngorongoro National Park (outside
of Serengeti).7 2 Uganda has removed the Batwa from Bwindi and Mgahinga
National Parks to protect mountain gorillas." Sri Lanka has removed
indigenous peoples to protect Maduru Oya National Park.74 In the name of
68. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *2-3, Herrera v. Wyoming, 138 S. Ct.
2707 (2018) (No. 17-532).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, at Art.
19 (Sept 13, 2007).
72. See Chris Lang, "Forced Evictions of Maasai People in Loliondo, Tanzania?
Urgent Alert from the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs,
CONSERVATION-WATCH (Aug. 30, 2017), http://www.conservation-watch.
org/2017/08/30/forced-evictions-of-maasai-people-in-loliondo-tanzania-
urgent-alert-from-the-international-work-group-for-indigenous-affairs
[http://perma.cc/388F-6UYT]; Karen McVeigh, "Land Means Life":




73. See Thomas Fessy, Batwa Face Uncertain Future, BBC NEWS (May 9, 2008).
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7390917.stm [http://perma
.cc/DH34-3U2B].
74. See John Vidal, The Tribes Paying the Brutal Price ofConservation, GUARDIAN




conservation, Mongolia has banned the Dukha from hunting in protected
areas within their traditional lands.75 Thailand has removed ethnic Hmong
and the Karen from forests designated as wildlife sanctuaries.76 The list
goes on.
While eviction from lands and deprivation of traditional livelihoods
amount to profound harms, they are by no means the only harms
associated with conservation efforts. Much of the discontent surrounding
some of the national monuments in the U.S. comes down to the
monuments locking in conservation at the expense of economic
opportunities for people who live in proximity to the monuments. For
example, as environmentalists praised President Clinton for setting aside
the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in southern Utah,
surrounding communities felt the Monument would deprive them of much
needed jobs and economic development.77 The harms alleged often were
couched in terms of the Monument depriving an economically depressed
area of much needed economic growth and well-paying jobs. Much of the
rationale for President Trump's drastic reduction of this monument and
aug/28/exiles-human-cost-of-conservation-indigenous-peoples-eco-tourism
[http://perma.cc/2UY3-52UN].
75.. See Dene-Hern Chen, Mongolia's Reindeer Herders Defend Their Way of Life,
AL JAZEERA (Mar. 18, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/
2017/03/mongolia-reindeer-herders-defend-life-170315082203586.html
[http://perma.cc/75ZX-WWBY]; Selcen Kucukestel, Mongolian Reindeer
Herders Banned from Huntingin the Name of "Conservation' SURVIVAL (Dec.
22, 2015), http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/11072 [http://
perma.cc/F8DD-KBEA].




77. See, e.g., Phil Taylor, Grand Staircase-Escalante Winners and Losers, E&E
NEWS (July 14, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060040270
[http://perma.cc/2MJ7-2T9D].
78. See id ("President Clinton designated the monument in 1996 in large part to
block a planned coal mine that had promised several hundred local jobs and
millions of dollars in royalty payments."); see also id (quoting Utah Rep.
Chris Stewart claiming that the monument has "decimated the local
economies" and noting that while tourism jobs have increased, many of
those service-sector jobs are low-wage and seasonal, forcing workers to hold
down multiple jobs to scrape by).
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the Bears Ears National Monument in recent months centered on the
desire to open up resource extraction to local communities again.
We see similar threads in the efforts to protect super greenhouse gas
sinks, like preserving the tropical rainforests in Africa and South America
(particularly the Amazon), as a strategy to mitigate climate change. Within
international law, this strategy is referred to as reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation (frequently referred to by its quasi-
acronym REDD+). While this originally began solely as an attempt to
reduce deforestation, it did not take long for it to become apparent that
attempts to preserve the forest sometimes worked against the livelihoods
of many of the local people in and around the forest. As a result, alongside
efforts to reduce deforestation and degradation, we see efforts to provide a
buffer for the local people most affected by conservation measures.
Specific strategies have included payments for environmental services,
formal legal recognition of local rights, and expanding livelihood options
and alternative sources of forest products. Important work by Professor
William Boyd has both documented and,. in some instances, facilitated
efforts to work closely with local peoples to voice and understand their
interests.8 0
2. Species Protection
Another area in which social justice issues complicate environmental
protection is the pursuit of the protection of animals and, to a lesser
extent, plants. The fact that protecting species has consequences for
human lives and the economy should come as no surprise. Critics of laws
designed to protect species are quick to point out how these laws collide
with human interests. For example, Judge Smith of the Ninth Circuit has
argued that the externalities of the Endangered Species Act are so great
that it is unthinkable that Congress meant to unleash the tumult caused by
the enactment. As a preface to a dissenting opinion, he noted that his
"intent is solely to illuminate the downside of our actions in such
79. See Julie Turkewitz, Trump Slashes Size of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase
Monuments, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/
12/04/us/trump-bears-ears.html [http://perma.cc/B7BD-9QUJ].
80. See William Boyd, Deforestation and Emerging Greenhouse Gas Compliance
Regimes: Toward a Global Environmental Law of Forests, Carbon, and
Climate Governance, in DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (Valentina




environmental cases."8 1 After providing examples of how the Endangered
Species Act hurt miners in the case before the court and loggers and
farmers in other cases, he summarized by saying, "No legislature or
regulatory agency would enact sweeping rules that create such economic
chaos, shutter entire industries, and cause thousands of people to lose
their jobs." 8 2 In a case brought by small-scale farmers and loggers, Justice
Scalia also emphasized that the impacts often fell on the less well-off when
he lamented that the Endangered Species Act restrictions "impose
unfairness to the point of financial ruin-not just upon the rich, but upon
the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national zoological
use."83
Not surprisingly, the bigger and more dangerous the animal, the more
frustrated those who live near such animals are when told not to interfere
with them. Big predators pose particularly acute problems. Whether it be
wolves in Wyoming, lions in Tanzania, or tigers in India, we find countless
conflicts between humans and predators.8 4 Often these conflicts stem from
problems associated with livestock becoming prey. In trying to protect
these predators, different policy solutions have been found with their
associated just environmentalism wrinkles. These range from providing
some form of compensation for lost livestock to pushing people out of
areas where the predators are found.85 Similar issues arise when laws
protect animals that might not be that dangerous but that are large and
capable of inflicting substantial collateral damage on people's lands and
livelihoods. For example, outside of the rainforests of Uganda, conflicts can
81. Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011)
(Smith, J., dissenting).
82. Id. Professor Barton Thompson has made similar arguments: "It is unlikely
that Congress could or would have passed the Endangered Species Act or the
Clean Water Act had it been aware that the laws would require significant
reductions in existing water diversions." Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Law
as a Pragmatic Exercise: Professor Joseph Sax's Water Scholarshio, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 373-74 (1998).
83. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. See Dale D. Goble, Of Wolves and Welfare Ranching 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
101 (1992); Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance
ofBeing Wild, 23 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1999).
85. See Goble, supra note 84; Abishek Hariharab et. al, Human Resettlement and
Tiger Conservation, 169 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 167 (2014).
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arise when jungle elephants or gorillas raid the gardens of those living
outside of the forest.8 6
Another opportunity for such conflict arises when hunting and fishing
are banned or restricted. Particularly where this is not just a restriction of
highly valued animals in the market (e.g., poaching trophy game), such
restrictions might push some vulnerable people into an even more
desperate situation. While such restrictions certainly affect many different
populations, indigenous people are particularly vulnerable to such harm.
Thus, for example, the San of the Kalahari Desert have been banned from
hunting large game in Botswana to accommodate safari tourism and the
sale of government hunting licenses marketed to tourists.87 We can find
similar stories about restrictions on salmon fishing or whale harvesting
among first nations in the United States.8 8
B. Pollution Control
When it comes to pollution control, a very common criticism in
political discourse is that reducing pollution comes at the cost of jobs. As
we discussed earlier in the context of environmental conservation of
wilderness, forests, and species, the trade-off between jobs and
environment is one of the most direct and commonly observed conflicts
between the needs of the poor and the goals of environmental protection.
The examples in this Section are, in many respects, the pollution control
analogs to the preservation examples in the previous Section. In some
instances, a lower-income community will prefer the promise of jobs,
economic growth, and an increased tax base to protection from pollution
86. See Francine Madden, Gorillas in the Garden-Human-Wildlife Conflict at
Bwindilmpenetrable National Parl 14 POL'Y MATTERS 180, 185-189 (2006).
87. See Sello Motseta, Outcry Over Ban on Huntingin Botswana's Parks, BUSINESS
DAY (Aug. 27, 2013, 9:45 AM), http://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/
world/africa/2013-08-27-outcry-over-ban-on-hunting-in-botswanas-parks
[http://perma.cc/TVY2-KR7K]; John Vidal, Botswana Bushmen: " You Deny
Us the Right To Hunt, You Are Killing Us," GUARDIAN (Apr. 18, 2014, 12:59
AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/apr/18/kalahari-bu
shmen-hunting-ban-prince-charles [http://perma.cc/Q2CA-EBYR].
88. See, e.g., Rachel D'Oro, Native Hunters Kill Whale That Made Its Way to






harms, particularly when the community has few other development
choices.
To highlight the potential costs at stake, we begin with the example of
the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians, a small tribe whose reservation
is located near Tooele, Utah, not far from Salt Lake City. The tribe has few
economic development prospects. 89 The Goshute people were traditionally
hunter-gatherers who traversed the intermountain west to move with the
seasons to utilize the region's resources. 90 Their ability to fish, gather
plants, and hunt was circumscribed by their relegation to the desolate area
of the Skull Valley. Their reservation is resource-poor. The soil is poor
quality, even if there were water available for irrigation or grazing.
Moreover, surrounding lands have "been used for chemical and biological
weapons development and testing, a nerve gas storage facility, a coal-fired
electrical power plant that caused air pollution, a low-level radioactive
disposal site, two hazardous waste incinerators, one hazardous waste
landfill, and a magnesium plant identified by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) as the most polluting plant of its kind in the United States."9 '
Because there were so few other existing prospects for economic
development on the Skull Valley Goshute reservation, the tribe, like other
tribes during the same era, became interested in the economic
opportunities offered by nuclear waste disposal and storage.9 2 Indeed,
Skull Valley Band of Goshute Chairperson Leon Bear argued that "since the
reservation is already both symbolically and literally a wasteland, the Skull
Valley Band of Goshute should make money from storing another form of
waste-nuclear waste."9 3 Since Utah's Tooele County had "designated
[surrounding areas] as an industrial waste zone," the tribe was simply
opting for an economic development opportunity "that fits in with that
designation."94
89. See James B. Martin-Schramm, Skull Valley: Nuclear Waste, Tribal
Sovereignty, and Environmental Racism, in CHRISTIAN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS:
A CASE METHOD APPROACH, 218, 242 (im Martin-Schramm & Robert L. Stivers
eds., 2003).
90. See Carling I. Malouf, The Gosiute Indians, in THE SHOSHONE INDIANS 25, 52-59
(David Agee Horr ed., 1974).
91. Danielle Endres, From Wasteland to Waste Site: The Role of Discourse in
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In 2005 and 2006, Utah lawmakers moved to thwart the Tribe's
proposal. The opposition to the proposal to store nuclear waste made
strange bedfellows of conservative Republican politicians and wilderness
advocates. Traditionally opposed to federal land use protections, which
they typically viewed as intrusions on state sovereignty, conservative Utah
officials joined forces with environmental groups to create the Cedar
Mountain Wilderness Area. The coalition of conservatives and
environmentalists successfully petitioned for the wilderness designation
of lands surrounding the Tribe's reservation and thereby blocked the Skull
Valley Goshute's efforts. The wilderness designation precluded the
building of the railroad lines that would have been necessary to transport
the nuclear waste to the reservation.95 Once the Skull Valley Goshute's
plans were thwarted, neither Utah lawmakers nor the environmental
groups that had helped block the development appeared to be much
concerned with the ongoing economic distress on the reservation or the
ability of the Tribe to make meaningful decisions about its future.
Numerous other examples of these kinds of conflicts can be identified.
For example, as discussed in the Introduction, after the BP Oil Spill, the
Obama administration imposed a moratorium on drilling in the Gulf. That
moratorium, designed to prevent further damage to the already critically
endangered Gulf environment,96 nonetheless imposed serious economic
costs on working-class citizens whose jobs depend on the oil and gas
95. See Associated Press, Nuclear Waste? Utah Says Not in Our Wilderness:
Lawmakers Get Designation as Way to Stop Proposed Storage Site, NBC NEWS
(Feb. 15, 2006, 01:09 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11362386/
ns/us-news-environment/t/nuclear-waste-utah-says-not-our-wilderness
[http://perma.cc/2UWP-M6Y9] (noting that "[f]or more than two decades,
Utah's congressional delegation rejected wilderness proposals," "but they
united behind the idea of protecting this 55-mile stretch that divides barren
Skull Valley and the desolate salt flats that are already home to an array of
military and industrial hazards" to "cut[] off the only practical route for rail
spur delivering heavy steel casks of spent fuel rods to the Goshute
reservation").
96. The moratorium was also designed to protect worker safety. See, e.g., U.S.
DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DECISION MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE SUSPENSION OF CERTAIN
OFFSHORE PERMITTING AND DRILLING ACTIVITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
(July 12, 2010), http://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/deepwat
erhorizon/upload/Salazar-Bromwich-July-12-Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/V2
US-XR53] (noting that the Secretary was acting pursuant to his obligation to
ensure that drilling is "conducted in a manner that is safe for workers,




industry." More mundane instances when pollution control measures
burden environmental justice communities occur, for example, when state
or federal regulatory agencies block or increase the cost of siting of
pollution-producing facilities in areas hungry for the jobs and increased
tax base that economic development promises. To be clear, this does not
mean that vulnerable communities oppose the environmental protections.
Many in such communities (even most) might favor the protections, but
often there are also others who are conflicted or even opposed to
environmental measures for the sake of economic opportunities. We see
these costs as coal-fired plants have shuttered in recent years. Even
though most of these plants are facing hard times because of increased
competition from cheap natural gas and renewables, part of their
economic trouble arguably comes from environmental regulation.
Opponents of President Obama's Clean Power Plan have cheered Trump's
effort to rollback the Plan, calling the environmental regulations "job-
killing" and arguing that the regulations "were a wet blanket on the ...
economy." 98
C. Regressive Environmental Taxes, Subsidies, and Mandates
The examples in this Section identify an array of environmental
protection measures-particularly taxes and subsidies-that share a
common feature: they all make essential (or at least important) goods and
services more expensive for the poor. Moreover, because purchase of these
goods and services consumes a larger percentage of the budget of the poor
than of those who are more affluent, these measures are regressive.
Although less common, the disproportionate burden on the poor may also
be exacerbated in some of these examples because, even in absolute terms,
the poor may incur higher costs than the affluent because, for example,
97. See Associated Press, supra note 4.
98. See Kiah Collier, Trump Unveils Major Rollback of Obama's Clean Power
Plan, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 21, 2018), http://www.texastribune.org/2018/
08/21/trump-unveils-major-rollback-obamas-clean-power-plan [http://
perma.cc/SVVF-34P7]. Opponents raise this objection even though the Clean
Power Plan, if implemented, would promote job growth in different
industries, like green energy. The growth of green jobs is, of course, of little
comfort to those workers who lose power-plant jobs if they cannot
transition to jobs in the emerging green economy. See Sidney A. Shapiro &
Robert R.M. Verchick, Inequality, Green Resilience, and the Green Economy,
86 UMKC L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2018).
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they drive older, less fuel-efficient vehicles or because they live in poorly
insulated homes with less energy efficient appliances.
Most of these measures involve pollution control rather than
conservation efforts. However, these measures can sometimes be enacted
to further conservation goals, such as prohibiting people from hunting or
fishing endangered species (even for subsistence purposes) or proscribing
agricultural methods (such as slash-and-burn subsistence agriculture) that
threaten forests. These kinds of measures, too, can impose a
disproportionate burden on the poor who are most likely to be engaged in
subsistence agriculture and most dependent on local natural resources for
survival.
1. Environmental Taxes
Environmental taxes are a frequently employed tool for internalizing
the costs of environmental pollution and thus shifting consumption away
from products with relatively high environmental costs. One common
example of an environmental tax is a gas tax: increasing the gas tax
incentivizes drivers to drive less and decreases greenhouse gas emissions.
Gas taxes can disproportionately impact the poor, particularly those who
depend on cars-often older model cars with low fuel efficiency-to get to
work." The degree of regressivity of transportation subsidies and taxes in
any given location is likely to depend on the quality of available public
transportation and the rates of car ownership among the poor.100
Broader energy taxes, such as proposed carbon taxes, are also likely to
be regressive-inflicting "a heavier burden on low-income households
than on high-income households" because they "affect the cost of heating,
electricity and transport," and lower-income households "spend a larger
99. Katri Kosonen, Regressivity of Environmental Taxation: Myth or Reality?,
EUR. COMM'N 7, Taxation Paper No. 32-2012 (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/taxa
tionscustoms/sites/taxation/files/docs/body/taxationpaper_32_en.pdf
[http://perma.cc/89EY-U8AH] (reporting studies in the US and UK that
show "that middle-income groups bear a higher burden of gasoline tax in the
US than either low- or high-income groups," but that "if only car-owning
households are considered, the impact of fuel taxation would be
regressive").
100. See id. at 19 (observing that some countries' fuel taxes were not regressive,
probably because of the "supply of good-quality transport" that "ma[de] a





share of their income" on these necessities.' 0 Indeed, the empirical
evidence suggests that energy taxes are more likely to be regressive than
gasoline taxes.10 2 Moreover, social justice concerns are most acute when
the tax is on goods (or services) such as energy that are essential-for
which at least some level of consumption is necessary and for which
adequate substitutes do not exist-that is, when the tax is on goods for
which demand is relatively inelastic. There are nonetheless a variety of
available mechanisms for reducing an energy tax's regressivity, including
using "tax revenues to finance lump-sum transfers" 03 or creating tax
exemptions for low-income households.'0 4
2. Environmental Subsidies
a. Net Metering
There are a wide variety of subsidies for environmentally-friendly
behavior that can make goods and services-often essential goods and
services-more expensive for the poor. In recent years, one of the most
visible and contentious of these subsidies is net metering for residential
solar energy production. Solar energy produces numerous environmental
benefits, including reduced greenhouse gas emissions, by decreasing
consumption of fossil fuel. However, one of the most controversial issues
surrounding residential generation of solar power has been the price
electric utilities pay solar customers for excess power that the customers
send back into the electricity grid. Residential solar customers often
produce more power than they need during the day but need to draw
electricity from the grid at night or during particularly inclement weather.
Net metering policies provide credits to solar customers for the excess
power they generate during the day and feed into the electricity grid that
can be used to offset the power the homes draw from the grid at night or
during other periods in which the home's electricity consumption exceeds
its generation. 0 5
101. Id at 1.
102. Seeid. at 7.
103. Id. at 18.
104. See id. at 16.
105. Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE &
ENERGY L. 115, 118 (2015).
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Many electric utilities have challenged requirements that they
compensate solar customers at the retail (rather than wholesale) rate for
the power those customers feed into the grid. 10 6 The utilities typically
contend that solar customers are using and benefitting from the electricity
grid without having to pay for that infrastructure or its maintenance, and
that credits for solar customers should therefore be reduced to ensure that
they pay their fair share for that grid infrastructure.10 7 In particular, they
argue that poorer customers who cannot afford solar panels are being
forced to subsidize richer customers who can.108
Some groups representing poor or otherwise vulnerable communities
have joined utility companies in their efforts to decrease credits to solar
customers. For example, a National Black Caucus of State Legislators white
paper explained:
We are concerned about the regressive nature of the cost-shifting
that results from the net metering policies used to make DG
[distributed generation] appear to be a more attractive financial
proposition. The end result is that households not able to afford
DG systems are inadvertently left to pay more for the electric grid.
These costs will continue to escalate as DG providers continue to
market to more affluent households. The last in line will continue
to share an increasingly larger financial burden.1 09
106. Id.
107. Hiroko Tabuchi, Rooftop Solar Dims Under Pressure from Utility Lobbyists,
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/08/climate/
rooftop-solar-panels-tax-credits-utility-companies-lobbying.html - [http://
perma.cc/DYX3-U44Z] ("Utilities argue that net metering, in place in over 40
states, turns many homeowners into free riders on the grid, giving them an
unfair advantage over customers who do not want or cannot afford solar
panels."). Some scholars argue that net metering is not as regressive as it
appears because any rate increases are likely to be "modest" and "would
barely begin to offset the massive cross-subsidies for which low-income
customers already qualify," in the form of "significant rate discounts" already
available to low-income households. Rule, supra note 105, at 136-37.
108. See Rule, supra note 105, at 136-37.
109. Nat'l Black Caucus of State Legislators Comm. on Energy Transportation &






By some accounts, these efforts, and resulting state reforms, have
taken a significant toll on the blossoming residential solar industry.110
Almost every state is reconsidering its approach to solar customers, and
several states have already decided to "phase out net metering," while
others have increased solar customer fees."'
b. Subsidies for Electric Cars
Similar criticisms can also be leveled against subsidies for electric or
natural-gas vehicles that produce less greenhouse gas emissions than
typical gasoline-fueled cars. While straight subsidies for the purchase of
cleaner cars might not have obvious distributional effects, drivers of such
cars pay less gasoline tax, which is used in many states to subsidize road
building and maintenance. Such subsidies might eventually lead to higher
gasoline taxes or other increased road fees, which in turn leads to higher
transportation costs for those who cannot afford more expensive electric
or natural gas vehicles. 1 2 In some states, owners of cleaner cars pay
reduced licensing and registration fees, money that is also often directed
110. Tabuchi, supra note 107 (noting that "rooftop solar panel installations have
seen explosive growth" in recent years but that new installations are
"projected [to] decline" by two percent in 2017, a "decline [that has]
coincided with a concerted and well-funded lobbying campaign by
traditional utilities, which have been working in state capitals across the
country to reverse incentives [created by net metering] for homeowners to
install solar panels"); id. (arguing that utility company efforts have "met with
considerable success, dimming the prospects for renewable energy across
the United States"); see also Joby Warrick, Utilities Wage Campaign Against




111. Tabuchi, supra note 107 ("Since 2013, Hawaii, Nevada, Arizona, Maine and
Indiana have decided to phase out net metering.").
112. Even with current federal tax credits, the upfront purchase price of most
electric cars still exceeds that of standard, internal-combustion-engine cars.
See, e.g., Zach McDonald, HowLong Does It Take To Recoup the Extra Cost of
an Electric Car? EV INDUSTRY (June 16, 2016), http://www.fleetcarma.com/
miles-recoup-cost-electric-car [http://perma.cc/G25H-ENHC].
39
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
to road construction and repair.' 13 Thus, similar to the case of net
metering, less affluent car owners may be paying more to maintain the
transportation grid than more affluent owners who purchase cleaner cars,
even though all cars inflict relatively equal wear and tear on roads. Of
course, as the price of cleaner vehicles declines, these distributive
concerns may be allayed.
c. Ethanol Subsidies
Over the last several decades, the United States and other countries
have-through a combination of subsidies and mandates-propelled
tremendous growth in the production of biofuels, which have been viewed
as a cleaner, renewable alternative to fossil fuels.1 14 While the
environmental benefits of biofuels have been the subject of debate,11 s
expanded biofuel production has had a clear impact on corn markets, as a
considerable percentage of corn has been diverted from food markets to
ethanol production. 16 While the extent of the resulting pressure on food
prices is disputed, a meta-analysis of recent studies on the issue estimated
that "each billion-gallon expansion in ethanol production yields a 2-3
percent increase in corn prices on average across studies."11 The meta-
analysis also found that "biofuels expansion will raise the number of
people at risk of hunger or in poverty in developing countries."118
113. See, e.g., Katy Murphy, Pothole Relief? California Deal Includes 12-Cent Gas
Tax Hike, Electric Car Fee, MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 30, 2017, 8:43 AM),
http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/03/29/california-lawmakers-
nearing-major-deal-to-pay-for-road-fixes [http://perma.cc/7UCA-8F8Y].
114. Nicole Condon et al., Impacts of Ethanol Policy on Corn Prices., A Review and




115. See, e.g., Kevin Bullis, Do Biofuels Reduce Greenhouse Gases, MIT TECH. REV.
(May 20, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/s/424050/do-biofuels-
reduce-greenhouse-gases [http://perma.cc/5RWR-E54J].






3. Environmental Mandates that Increase the Cost of Essential
Goods for the Poor
An extensive array of environmental mandates-most designed for
pollution control-may also hurt the poor and vulnerable by increasing
the cost of necessary goods and services. For example, bans or restrictions
on wood-burning stoves that are aimed at reducing air pollution-
including particulate matter pollution-may eliminate an important
source of relatively cheap winter heat for low-income and rural
residents.11 9 Similarly, bans or restrictions on artificial fertilizers,
pesticides, herbicides, and genetically-modified crops may also hurt the
poor by driving up the cost of food. 1 2 0 More stringent environmental
regulation of power plants may increase the price of energy. There is also
some evidence that energy efficiency standards for automobiles and
household appliances may be "more regressive than energy taxes," such as
a carbon tax. 1 2 1
We could continue describing examples of the disproportionate
burdens that environmental protection can impose on poor communities
and communities of color, but these examples give some sense of the
breadth and depth of the problem. The scope and variety of the problem
suggest that we ought to at least consider ways to think more
systematically about these kinds of issues. In the next Part, we expand on
119. See, e.g., Barbara Christiansen, Utah County Residents Oppose Ban on Wood
Burning, DAILY HERALD (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.heraldextra.com/news/
local/utah-county-residents-oppose-ban-on-wood-burning/article-90d448
a4-796d-536e-8ca6-3c36aafcb46b.html [http://perma.cc/3BYS-FPR8]
(noting that some residents opposed Utah's wood-burning restrictions
because "they cannot afford natural gas or the more expensive propane").
120. Peter S. Wenz, Does Environmentalism Promote Injustice for the Poor." in
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 18, at 57, 59-60
(recounting arguments that "environmentalist opposition to agribusiness
harms the poor").
121. Arik Levinson, EnergyEfficiency Standards Are More Regressive than Energy
Taxes: Theory and Evidence 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 22956 Dec. 2016), http://faculty.georgetown.edu/aml6/pdfs&zip
s/RegressiveMandates.pdf [http://perma.cc/8KMT-DD3D] (arguing that
energy efficiency standards and energy taxes both "make poor households
worse off," "but the burden of energy taxes falls relatively less on poor
households than the burden of efficiency standards").
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the reasons that the impacts of environmental protection on the poor
should be given fuller consideration.
IV. WHY JUST ENVIRONMENTALISM
As we noted earlier, the just environmentalism project is very much in
its beginning stages, and we recognize that a project like this is not without
its risks. Broadening notions of environmental justice to consider the
disproportionate impacts of environmental protection on the vulnerable
may risk diverting environmental justice from its core mission and bog
environmental advocates down in seemingly insoluble, longstanding
debates about the clash between environmental values and economic
progress. It also raises the possibility that those who oppose
environmental protection for reasons other than just environmentalism
will strategically embrace it to cloak less publicly acceptable reasons for
opposing environmental protection, such as personal gain. However, we
believe that engaging these debates is critical to being true to the core
values of environmental justice. Additionally, from a more practical
standpoint, we believe it is likewise critical to building broader coalitions
and to continuing to make progress on many environmental protection
fronts. Subsection IV.A suggests five reasons why environmentalists
should consider this reconceptualization of environmental justice.
Subsection IV.B then takes up some of the likely objections to just
environmentalism.
A. The Case for Just Environmentalism
The arguments for just environmentalism range from philosophical
and ethical arguments to matters of practical politics. 1 2 2 In this Section, we
highlight five rationales that favor a more just environmentalism: the
growing incidence and diversity of issues - implicating just
environmentalism concerns; the need to substantiate the justice
component of environmental justice; the provision of guidance for
122. We recognize that including arguments about politics and strategy opens us
up to charges that we care about just environmentalism only for its
instrumental value, rather than its potential to achieve justice. Nonetheless,
given the critical challenges facing our planet, we feel it is important to
explore the comprehensive case for (and against) just environmentalism,




choosing between competing environmental protection measures with
similar overall costs and benefits; the potential to enhance environmental
protections by reducing political opposition; and the avoidance of
suboptimal environmental protection measures chosen precisely because
they burden the vulnerable more heavily than the rich.
First, as the examples in Part III suggest, the situations in which
environmental protection imposes disproportionate costs on the poor and
vulnerable are both common and diverse. The wide range of
circumstances and the frequency with which these problems appear
together suggest the need to develop not only a conceptual framework but
also practical tools to manage these conflicts between environmental
protection and social justice.
Second, broadening environmental justice to account for the costs that
environmental protection imposes on the vulnerable is necessary if we are
going to take seriously the justice part of environmental justice. One could,
of course, conclude that when environmental values clash with justice
values, environmental justice should favor environmental values. That
would not make environmental justice an empty concept because it might
still suggest, for example, the way that existing environmental problems
should be prioritized: other things being equal, we should prioritize those
environmental problems that impose particular, disproportionate
hardships on vulnerable communities.
We would suggest, however, that the justice component of
environmental justice should mean something more. The same moral and
ethical concerns for social justice that have motivated environmental
justice from its inception suggest the need for particular attention to the
interests of the poor, even when they appear to conflict with
environmental protection. As environmental and disaster law scholar
Lloyd Burton has argued in the context of forest preservation:
A policy favoring the preservation of ancient forests and the life
forms that inhabit them must also ameliorate its effects on those
whose livelihoods depend on the availability of (usually low-paid
and relatively hazardous) forest products jobs. To do otherwise
robs public policy of moral force; it sets emerging concerns with
environmental ethics squarely at odds with the welfare of people
at the economic margin, who have few or no alternatives to
employment in resource-extractive industries.
123. LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW ix (1991).
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Most accounts of environmental justice draw primarily on two
important facets of justice: distributive justice and procedural justice. 1 24
Distributive justice suggests that the burdens and benefits of "social
cooperation" should be distributed according to some principle of justice.
While acknowledging that "[]ustice is a disputed concept," 1 2 5 Peter Wenz
argues that "[i]t is possible... to sidestep the relative merits of...
competing conceptions of justice by relying on an uncontroversial
principle: justice increases when the benefits and burdens of social
cooperation are born equally, except when moral considerations or other
values justify greater inequality." 1 2 6
In most situations that implicate either traditional environmental
justice or just environmentalism, it is hard to conceive of any moral
considerations that would justify concentrating harms on the poor and
otherwise vulnerable, rather than-at the very least-distributing them
equally between the vulnerable and the more well-to-do. Indeed, there are
good reasons to suggest, as philosopher John Rawls does, that any
inequalities in the distribution of goods (including positions of influence
and power) are permissible only if they benefit society's least
advantaged.12 7 This is Rawls's famous "difference principle."128 In the
context of just environmentalism, this suggests, at a bare minimum, that a
policy is unjust if it disadvantages-or imposes unequal burdens-on the
poor.
Traditional environmental justice recognizes that it is particularly
unfair to concentrate the costs of economic development on the poor as
124. See, e.g., Jamieson, supra note 39, at 91.
125. Wenz, supra note 120, at 57.
126. Id.at58.
127. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 167-68 (1971).
128. Id. Of course, many people reject the difference principle, but alternative
formulations typically include a specific concern for the wellbeing of the
poor. For example, Cass Sunstein suggests that society should "ensure that
average income ... is as high as possible while also making adequate
provisions for those at the bottom." Cass Sunstein, Why Worry About
Inequality., KOREA HERALD (May 15, 2014, 8:30 PM), http://www.korea
herald.com/view.php?ud=20140515001472%20 [http://perma.cc/M4T8-
CZA7]. This alternative, which Sunstein suggests accords with the views of
many people in the U.S., allows for much greater income inequality, but still





they often reap fewer benefits from that development than do the rich.12 9
A similarly stark mismatch occurs when we inflict a disproportionate
share of the cost of environmental protection on the poor. Poor
communities typically contribute less to environmental degradation as
they usually consume less energy and other resources.13 0 Accordingly, if
the obligation to bear the costs of environmental protection arises at least
in part from one's contributions to-and responsibility for-the
environmental harm that warranted the intervention, poor communities
should typically bear less (not more) of the remedial costs.
The injustice of concentrating the costs of economic protection on the
poor and vulnerable is thus exacerbated in many situations because of
their limited contribution to the underlying environmental problems.
Indeed, this is one of the strongest arguments undergirding climate change
justice: those countries that have contributed least to climate change will
often suffer not only greater loss and damage from climate change but they
are also often asked to make the greatest sacrifices to limit greenhouses
gases, from slowing the pace of economic development and energy
consumption to foregoing industries and jobs that damage local forests
129. See, e.g., James K. Boyce & Aseem Shirvastva, Delhi'sAir Pollution Is a Classic
Case of Environmental justice, GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2016, 12:00 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/mar/09/delhi-
india-air-pollution-environmental-injustice-car-tax [http://perma.cc/6J3F-
TM7Q] (arguing that "Delhi's air pollution... is a classic case of
environmental justice": "[t]he city's affluent classes reap the lion's share of
the benefits from the activities that poison the air, while less privileged
residents bear most of the human health costs").
130. See, e.g., Burkett, supra note 12, at 14 (citing statistics that "African
Americans emit 20 percent less greenhouse gases per household"); David
Roberts, The Best Way to Reduce Your Personal Carbon Emissions: Don't Be
Rich, Vox (Dec. 26, 2017, 8:33 AM), http://www.vox.com/energy-and-
environment/2017/7/14/15963544/climate-change-individual-choices
[http://perma.cc/BUT9-YWJC] (noting that "the top 10 percent wealthiest in
the U.S. emit more than five times as much C02 per person as those on the
lower half of the income scale").
131. Burkett, supra note 12, at 187 (arguing that one of "the profound injustices
that inhere in climate change's disproportionate effects" is that "the unequal
burden... falls on those who have not been primarily responsible for climate
change, domestically as well as internationally"); id at 188 ("The
distribution of climate change impacts is likely to be increasingly unjust; for
that reason, it is imperative that the solutions proffered neither entrench
existing vulnerabilities nor introduce new ones.").
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that would otherwise act as carbon sinks. The injustice is arguably
multiplied when we consider that vulnerability itself is shaped largely by
structural forces, including structural racism, that stack the deck against
the poor and racial minorities.
The other important facet of environmental justice-procedural
justice-focuses mostly on ensuring that the vulnerable can participate in
the decision-making process. Procedural justice can take weaker and
stronger forms, including everything from giving affected communities
information, to giving them a voice or seat at the table in the decision-
making process, to granting the affected parties decisional autonomy-
power to make the ultimate decision. Procedural justice helps increase the
legitimacy and acceptability of the decision-making by ensuring that
affected parties' concerns were heard and considered. As many scholars
have argued, "Distributive and procedural justice are often intimately
interlinked.... Redistribution without empowerment can be short-lived,
and empowerment without redistribution can be an insult."1 32 These
considerations seem equally compelling whether we are addressing the
harms of environmental degradation or the harms of environmental
protection.
Third, attending to the distribution of the costs of environmental
protection might help environmentalists choose between different
environmental solutions that have similar benefits and similar overall
costs but differing cost distribution. An explicit focus on the distribution of
the costs of environmental protection would serve as an important
reminder to evaluate and acknowledge the distribution of the costs of
environmental protection and to choose solutions that minimize the
impacts on vulnerable groups. For example, when choosing between a
carbon tax, a gasoline tax, or an energy efficiency standard as potential
measures for mitigating greenhouse gases, a focus on distributional effects
would suggest that the relative regressivity of each of these policies ought
to be a factor in deciding which approach to adopt.' 3 3 Of course, part of
this evaluation might also include steps to mitigate the regressivity of the
selected policy. Thus, in some cases, distributive justice can be improved
without any increase in the cost of environmental protection.
Fourth, as a practical matter, addressing real and perceived conflicts
between economic interests and environmental protection would work to
132. Jouni Paavola, W. Neil Adger & Saleemul Huq, Multifaceted Justice in
Adaptation to Climate Change, in FAIRNESS IN ADAPTATION 263, 264 (2014).




reduce political opposition to continued environmental progress and
thereby might functionally work to heighten environmental protection.
Opponents of environmental protection have effectively painted the EPA
as a job-killing agency. Indeed, "mainstream environmental voices have
failed to articulate a persuasive alternative to dominant discourses about
the relationship between economic well-being and environmental
regulation" 134-discourses that suggest that environmental protection,
often imposed by outsiders, will destroy jobs and local economies, leaving
affected communities with no recourse. Certainly, there are many ways of
understanding what happened in the 2016 presidential election, but one
thing that seems clear is that the GOP is attempting to appeal to the
segment of voters who feel that efforts to protect the environment hurt
them economically. 13 5 In the current political climate, it seems likely that
enduring environmental progress can only be made if the interests of the
poor are given voice and weight.
Expanding environmental justice to encompass the costs of
environmental protection unlocks possibilities that might work to
strengthen existing coalitions and build new coalitions by helping to
reassure potential allies that environmental groups genuinely care about
the interests of the poor and disadvantaged and are not just using socially
134. Steve Schwarze, Silence and Possibilities of Asbestos Activism: Stories from
Libby and Beyond, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra
note 18, at 165, 175.
135. The Republican National Committee, Energy and Environment, GOP
http://www.gop.com/issue/energy-and-environment/canonical [http://
perma.cc/BMP4-67JR] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (stating on energy and the
environment that "decades of excessive government regulations and
lobbying have cost us tens of billions of dollars, diminished the production of
American energy, and wiped out thousands of jobs."); Mary Jordan & Kevin
Sullivan, 'Smothered'and 'ShovedAside'in Rural America, WASH. POST (Dec.
29, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/national/iowa-
farm-waters-trump/?utmterm=.7d572db781b3 [http://perma.cc/SNES-
UTR7] (attributing President Trump's success in rural Iowa during the 2016
presidential election, in part, to a general reaction against environmental
regulation in farming communities); Juana Summers, The 'Forgotten Tribe'
in West Virginia; WhyAmerica's White Working Class Feels Left Behind, CN N
(Sept. 20, 2016, 9:10 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/20/politics/electi
on-2016-white-working-class-donald-trump-kaiser-family-foundation/inde
x.html [http://perma.cc/6NV8-8MYL] (describing the perception among
white, working-class Americans in West Virginia's coal country that
regulation of the coal industry represents a serious economic threat).
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vulnerable groups as props or pawns to further environmental interests.
Environmentalists have long been subject to charges that they exploit
vulnerable groups when it suits their interests and abandon them when
those interests are in tension. This appearance has, understandably,
fostered distrust and even anger in many vulnerable communities who
view environmentalists as fickle, unreliable allies at best and traitors and
hypocrites at worst.
This critique of environmental justice seems particularly apt in the
context of the relationship between environmental justice and indigenous
peoples. As Professor Reb&cca Tsosie observes, the environmental justice
movement has been criticized by tribal leaders for stereotyping tribes as
dupes of corporations, victims of federal manipulation, or "noble people
who live in harmony with the land."136 Such stereotypes disrespect the
right to tribal self-determination to resist manipulation and to make
sophisticated calculations about resource development. In 2009, for
example, lawmakers of the Hopi Tribe in Arizona, supported by leaders of
the Navajo tribe, "declared environmental groups unwelcome on the[ir]
reservation"1 17 because they believed environmentalists were actively
undermining the tribe's economic interests by opposing coal mining.1 38
Navajo President Joe Shirley Jr. charged, "Environmentalists are good at
identifying problems but poor at identifying feasible solutions.... Most
often they don't try to work with us but against us, giving aid and comfort
to those opposed to the sovereign decision-making of tribes." 3 "
Conversely, a willingness on the part of environmentalists and
policymakers to consider effects on the poor, to respect the voices and
input of the vulnerable, and to empower tribal self-determination even
when tribal interests do not fully align with environmental protection, may
make it less likely that vulnerable communities align themselves with
136. SeeTsosie, Environmentalfustice, supra note 12, at 1630-31.
137. Felicia Fonseca, Associated Press, Coal Conflict: Hope, Navajo Tribes Say




139. Id. Another prominent example of mainstream environmental groups
disregarding tribal interests is the national Sierra Club and Friends of the
Earth's vociferous and tenacious opposition to the Havasupai tribe's
persistent efforts to recover some of their tribal lands. See, e.g., Krakoff,




interests opposed to environmental protection. 14 0 As Professor Robert
Bullard has argued, "[U]nless an environmental movement emerges that is
capable of addressing these economic concerns, people of color and poor
white workers are likely to end up siding with corporate managers in key
conflicts concerning the environment." 41 So, even if achieving justice may
reduce environmental protection in some cases, conceding this would
allow environmental advocates to build up credibility with communities
they often struggle to win over.
In the net metering context, for example, some environmentalists
contend that electricity utilities have successfully weaponized social
justice interests to protect utility profits by blocking environmental
measures. 14 2 If environmentalists could find approaches that neutralize
the just environmentalism concerns created by net metering, they would
be better equipped to smoke out the utility companies' true motivations:
whether their aim is to shield low-income customers from unfair burdens
or whether it is to limit disruption to the energy sector's traditional
business model by limiting the growth of solar energy. In California, for
example, many social justice advocates have supported net metering-
rather than joining utility company objections-both because they believe
that solar energy, on the whole, benefits vulnerable groups and because of
programs fostering minority and low-income participation in the benefits
of clean energy.1 4 1
140. Cf Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the
Environmental Justice Movement in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM:
VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS 15, 23 (Robert D. Bullard ed. 1993) (describing
how "[w]orkers of color are especially vulnerable to job blackmail"-in
which they are forced to accept jobs that risk their own health and that of
their communities-"because of the greater threat of unemployment they
face . . . and because of their concentration in low-paying, unskilled,
nonunionized occupations").
141. Id.
142. Arturo Carmona, "executive director of Presente.org, the nation's largest
online Latino organizing group" has accused California utility companies of
"using Latinos and others who live in middle- and lower-income
communities as pawns in a war against rooftop solar." Arturo Carmona,
Latinos Shouldn't Be Pawns in Fight Over Rooftop Solar Power, SACRAMENTO
BEE (Nov. 11, 2014 4:00 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-
ed/soapbox/article3788314.html, [http://perma.cc/CL89-HT5P].
143. See, e.g., Susannah Churchill, Social Justice Groups Urge California PUC to
Extend Net Metering, VOTE SOLAR (Mar. 10, 2015), http://votesolar.org/net-
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Encouraging environmentalists to evaluate and consider these costs-
and to work with affected groups as part of their core mission-might also
result in the creation of win-win solutions (or, as Professors Hari Osofsky
and Jacqueline Peel have characterized them, "going together
solutions"144 ) that would otherwise escape consideration. Working
together with vulnerable groups, not just to increase environmental
protection but to ensure that the related costs are not borne
disproportionately by the vulnerable-may help parties to identify and
develop new solutions that minimize the effects on vulnerable
communities. Thus, identifying and acknowledging situations in which
current solutions are win-lose might help policymakers, in consultation
with affected groups, figure out whether there are alternative approaches
that are win-win. For example, the regressive impacts of energy taxes or
net metering policies might be mitigated by weatherization initiatives in
low-income communities that would decrease both energy use and home
heating bills.
One potential rejoinder to the argument that environmental justice
ought to account for the costs that environmental protection imposes on
the poor is that when the interests of environmental protection and the
needs of the socially vulnerable diverge, it is usually (though not always)
in cases in which the needs of the poor for jobs and economic development
coincide with the interests of more economically powerful groups, such as
large corporations. To the extent that environmental justice is conceived
primarily as providing justice and redress to those who lack power to
ensure that their needs are accounted for, perhaps that impetus is absent,
or at least attenuated, when powerful corporations can act as proxies for
the economic needs of the poor.
This rejoinder is not fully persuasive, however, because even
substantial alignment between the needs of the vulnerable and the
interests of powerful groups is not the same as the vulnerable being able
to access and exercise power on their own behalf. Moreover, the interests
metering-rates/california-social-justice [http://perma.cc/4HDS-3SPU] ("We
urge the Commission to continue making net metering available to
customers who go solar after the current cap is reached and to explore
innovative additional approaches-including virtual net metering,
community shared renewables, new tariffs and workforce development
programs-to help more low-income families and communities of color
participate in and benefit from California's growing clean energy economy.").





of the poor may diverge in important ways from the interests of the
corporations that provide them jobs. 1 45 Coal companies, for example, have
an interest in their own profits and in preserving that profit stream in
perpetuity. Coal miners, in contrast, have an interest in continued jobs and
may prefer the jobs that coal companies have traditionally provided. At
least some of the coal miners' economic interests, however, might be
satisfied by job retraining, access to other types of education, or the
growth of other economic sectors (and concomitant job opportunities) in
their geographic region. In the long term, coal miners' economic interests
might be better satisfied by some of these alternative solutions, but these
solutions provide essentially no upside for coal companies, who thus have
no incentive to advocate for them.
Fifth, failure to account for the disproportionate impacts of
environmental protection on the poor may lead to suboptimal
environmental policies. If there is no obligation and no mechanism in
environmental law to allow compensation to the poor in at least some
cases in which they are disproportionately burdened by environmental
protection efforts, such efforts may well be designed to concentrate
burdens on the poor rather than on other groups precisely because they
are poor and presumably will have less capacity and less influence to resist
those measures. Thus, this route represents the path-of-least-resistance
for getting the measure enacted. This is problematic not only from a justice
perspective but also because a measure that burdens the poor may be less
efficient or effective than ones with other distributional consequences. As
Professor Barton Thompson has written in the context of whether
property owners ought to be compensated for harms that endangered
species protection imposes on them:
[A] no compensation rule will also encourage property owners to
oppose new listings of endangered species, undermining all
recovery efforts for those species. A no compensation rule biases
those species-recovery efforts that do occur toward property-
focused efforts and, because property owners vary among
themselves in the political power they enjoy, distorts which
145. Cf Bullard, supra note 140, at 23 (noting that on many environmental issues
an "inherent conflict exists between the interests of capital and that of
labor," but that "workers of color" are often forced to compromise their
interests to avoid unemployment": "Workers will tell you that
'unemployment and poverty are also hazardous to one's health."').
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property is used for habitat preservation and which landowners
bear the burden of preservation. 4 6
Without some special attention to the burdens that environmental
protection measures impose on the vulnerable, we would expect that
environmental protection will often be implemented in ways that
particularly burden the vulnerable even when there are more effective,
more efficient approaches that would instead burden wealthier individuals
and communities.1 4 7 Considering and accounting for the costs an
environmental protection measure imposes on the poor helps prevent this
"distortion" in the structure and enforcement of environmental law.
B. Objections to Just Environmentalism
A fair examination of the case for just environmentalism also requires
confronting likely objections. This Section explores an array of arguments
that critics might level against this expansion of environmental justice.
First, there are a number of standard criticisms of either
environmental justice generally or of the mainstreaming of environmental
justice into the work of more traditional environmentalists. For example,
one objection to the incorporation of environmental justice into
environmental law and policymaking-an objection that applies equally to
traditional environmental justice and our conception of just
environmentalism-is made by economists like Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell, who argue that justice concerns are more efficiently addressed,
not on a case-by-case basis by altering individual laws and policies, but
instead through targeted redistribution using taxation and government
welfare programs. 4 Such claims would be more persuasive, however, if
146. Barton H. Thompson, The Endangered Species Act. A Case Study in Takings
and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 375 (1997).
147. For example, a city might decide to pursue water conservation by
significantly increasing the cost of water for homeowners, including low-
income homeowners, rather than targeting water waste at golf courses or
other amenities that typically serve the more well-to-do, even if targeting
those amenities would be a more effective, efficient way to conserve water.
148. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness v. Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REV. 961,
993-94 (2001) (arguing that "when legal rules do have distributive effects,
the effects usually should not be counted as favoring or disfavoring the rules
because distributional objectives can often be best accomplished directly,




the U.S. were, in fact, committed to providing a robust safety net for the
poor. Moreover, some of the kinds of harms-to cultures, way of life, and
religious practice-may not be effectively remedied by monetary
compensation and thus must be considered more fully in the formulation
of the relevant environmental policies.14 9
While consideration of all the potential objections to environmental
justice is outside of the scope of this paper, some of the standard criticisms
of mainstreaming environmental justice arguably apply with particular
force to the expansion of environmental justice to conflicts between
environmental protection and the interests of vulnerable groups. In
particular, some critics of mainstreaming environmental justice contend
that environmental justice is too anthropocentric 5 0 -valuing the
environment in purely human terms and elevating human interests, thus
neglecting the inherent value of preserving nature itself, including plants
and animals. 15 1 Such critics likewise contend that human "culture is often
reason economists have tended to favor these direct means of redistribution
is that they reach all individuals and are based explicitly on income.").
149. See, e.g., Tsosie, Environmental Justice, supra note 12, at 1625, 1645
(observing that "tort-based theories of compensation for the harms of
climate change have only limited capacity to address the concerns of
indigenous peoples" and asserting that some schemes for compensation and
relocation are "of little assistance to indigenous peoples" in part because of
the primacy of place to indigenous culture).
150. Both environmental justice and some strains of mainstream
environmentalism can be characterized as anthropocentric. See Wenz, supra
note 120, at 58 (explaining that "[a]nthropocentric environmentalism
centers on the belief that industrial societies are destroying natural
resources and processes upon which human flourishing depends" whereas
"[n]onanthropocentric environmentalists believe additionally that, even
when human welfare is unaffected, people should protect species from
extinction, ecosystems from degradation, and nonhuman animals from
cruelty").
151. Thus, for example, Professor Kevin Deluca asserts that to fully embrace
environmental justice as a lodestar of environmental policy is to indulge "a
most pernicious form of anthropocentrism, wherein only human interests
count" Kevin M. Deluca, A Wilderness Environmentalism Manifesto:
Contesting the Infinite Self-Absorption of Humans, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
AND ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 18, at 31; see also id at 43 (arguing that
true "[w]ilderness environmentalism holds out hope from the multiple
anthropocentric worldviews"-such as environmental justice-"that have
done enough harm"); id. at 34 (contending that "abandoning wilderness and
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the problem and should not be a trump card used to stop protecting
species and ecosystems."1 5 2
One need not necessarily put humans first, however, to argue that we
ought to think carefully about addressing the harms suffered by people as
a result of environmental protection. Just because one worries about
human suffering does not mean that the suffering of other species is not
taken into account. Indeed, while we personally believe that the harm to
people may be so great in some contexts that it would be morally unjust to
pursue particular environmental protection measures, nothing about the
broader notion of just environmentalism would necessarily reduce
environmental protection. Rather, as discussed in greater length below,
justice in this context may merely require procedural and substantive
protections for those who are truly vulnerable.
To be clear, we do not argue that every harm related to environmental
protection needs to be addressed. In considering which and whose harms
count in this context, we primarily suggest compensating the truly
vulnerable who may suffer significant harms.1 s' Just environmentalism
does not mean that we must compensate, the "big business"' 5 4 of
environmental devastation. However, when people within that industry
are truly vulnerable, and especially when the impact on them is
substantial, the argument for some sort of protection or compensation for
that subgroup begins to gain strength.
Second, environmentalists might be concerned that expanding
environmental justice claims to include the disproportionate harms of
environmental protection might result in too little environmental
protection. In the traditional environmental justice situation-in which the
costs of environmental degradation are concentrated on the poor-richer,
more privileged elites who have outsized voice and power in determining
environmental policy might be inclined to "buy" too much environmental
environmental protection as a first principle leads environmental groups to
abandon environmental criteria as a means of judging practices and policies"
and to substitute instead environmental justice's explicit prioritization of
"human, cultural, and economic concerns over environmental concerns").
152. Id. at 31. Indeed, Deluca insists that "environmental justice responses to
protecting endangered species represent another damaging aspect of human
self-absorption," id., and that "[p]utting humans always first is a crucial
cause of the environmental crisis we now face," id. at 34.
153. See infra Section V.A.




degradation because at least some of the cost of that degradation is
externalized to the vulnerable, who often lack political power. Thus,
recognizing traditional environmental concerns and granting increased
participation and power to vulnerable groups is likely to result, in more
overall environmental protection.15 5
Conversely, if the costs of environmental protection are concentrated
on the poor, then richer, more privileged groups will arguably "buy" too
much environmental protection-or, in any event, more than they would
otherwise be inclined to purchase-because some of the associated costs
are externalized to the vulnerable. Requiring internalization of some of
those costs-by, for example, directing targeted subsidies to the poor who
are harmed by the environmental measures, may increase the cost of
environmental protection and thus decrease the overall level of protection.
Environmentalists might therefore be reluctant to recognize these types of
just environmentalism claims, especially given that society may already
"underbuy" environmental protection because of the political dynamics
that exist when the benefits of environmental protection are diffuse but
the costs are concentrated on a discrete number of industrial players.' 56
Environmentalists might also point out that particularly expansive notions
of procedural environmental justice in this context-especially
approaches that recognize some groups' decision-making autonomy-
might block some kinds of environmental protection altogether.
While we cannot deny that taking just environmentalism seriously
would potentially modify or even decrease some environmental protection
155. Cf Bullard, supra note 140, at 23-24 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted) (arguing that "[t]he environmental crisis can simply not be solved
effectively without social justice" because ."whenever [an] in group directly
and exclusively benefits from its own overuse of a shared resource but the
costs of that overuse are shared by out-groups, then in group motivation
toward a policy of resource conservation ... is undermined"). Of course, in
some sense, environmental justice claims could also be addressed by
increasing the costs environmental degradation inflicts on the rich-thereby
equalizing the burdens. This approach might actually increase the amount of
environmental damage. So understood, environmental justice would have
"limited efficacy" because the "end result is to have all residents poisoned to
the same perilous degree, regardless of race, color or class." Faber, supra
note 18, at 145. In any event, it is unlikely that elites who hold the reins of
power would ever pursue such a course of action.
156. See, e.g., TIMOTHY M. SWANSON, THE ECONOMICS AND ECOLOGY OF BIODIVERSITY
DECLINE 19 (1998).
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measures, it is nonetheless important to recognize that addressing these
just environmentalism claims does not actually make environmental
protection more expensive. Instead, it focuses attention on who bears
those costs and potentially shifts those burdens to achieve a more just
distribution.15 Of course, that might nonetheless result in less
environmental protection if the politically powerful are unwilling to bear a
fuller share of those costs. It is nonetheless possible that some politically
powerful groups will be willing to pay more for environmental protection
if justice requires them to do so. Moreover, as discussed earlier, a more
just environmentalism may win over many poorer communities and
voters to the environmental cause, forging broader coalitions who support
environmental protection measures. The environmental protection
policies that emerge from these broader coalitions are also more likely to
be resilient and sustainable in the long term, even as control of
environmental policy shifts from party to party and administration to
administration.
The related concern that just environmentalism solutions recognizing
decision-making autonomy might completely thwart some environmental
protection can presumably be mitigated, though not completely
eliminated, by careful consideration of the kinds of situations in which it is
appropriate to recognize decision-making autonomy. Additionally, giving
fuller voice to the vulnerable who are impacted by proposed
environmental protection measures-and even giving them potential veto
power over certain decisions-may create incentives for innovation and
the development of more win-win solutions that move environmental
protection forward while protecting the economic interests of the most
vulnerable.
A third and related objection to just environmentalism might be that
focusing on the harm that environmental protection does to the present
population will skew environmental policy in ways that do serious damage
to the ability of future generations both to inherit a healthy planet and to
make a reasonable living. Thus, alleviating disproportionate burdens on
the vulnerable today might simply shift even more disproportionate
burdens onto tomorrow's vulnerable, as well as members of future
generations, more generally. One obvious answer to this critique is that
just environmentalism must be concerned with the harms to future
157. Of course, there may be costs associated both with gathering and providing





generations, as well as to current ones. Nonetheless, this objection retains
some force because, try as we might, it is far more difficult to give future
generations a seat at the table and to adequately value their interests.15 8
An even stronger version of this objection might suggest that the harm to
future generations from current and impending environmental crises-
particularly those associated with climate change-should outweigh any
harms to current generations because those harms are likely to be both
severe and irreversible.' 5 9 Such a critic might also point out that, given
these growing challenges, many job and cultural losses are inevitable, in
any event, if not in this generation, then in the foreseeable future.1 6 0
Applying principles of just environmentalism, however, is itself a way
to begin to protect future generations of vulnerable people. If we establish
a strong precedent for respecting the rights of the poor and vulnerable
today, marginalized groups are more likely to be able to call on the same
protection in the future and perhaps even build on it. Thus, by enshrining
concern for the most vulnerable among us in environmental policy, we are
taking a meaningful step in protecting tomorrow's vulnerable by the mere
declaration today that their rights and needs matter. The stronger and
more meaningful the declaration is today, the stronger and more
meaningful the protections that follow in the future will be.
Moreover, even if these critics are right, and perhaps particularly if
they are right, increasing the justice of environmental policies like climate
change mitigation is imperative. The United States is currently at an
impasse on many of today's most pressing environmental problems,
including climate change. At least part of the reason for this is that those
who fear the social and economic downsides of environmental solutions
stand in the way. A commitment to just environmentalism may be the very
thing needed to help assuage the concerns of many who are currently
158. See Jamieson, supra note 39, at 92 ("Poor people and those at the margins
are not alone in being disenfranchised. Future generations are not at the
table to defend their interests, and the use of standard decision-theoretic
tools such as the discount rate are often used to effectively dismiss even
their most important interests.").
159. See, e.g., id. at 35 (arguing that "the world is facing a catastrophe of historic
and unique proportions" and that "humans are threatening the vital signs of
planetary health in a manner and scale unprecedented in human history").
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opposed to more stringent environmental protection policies, to start
conversations that help identify win-win solutions, and to build broader
coalitions favoring action on climate change and other critical issues. So,
while it would be naive not to recognize the risk of just environmentalism
being strategically used to stall progress, it is also naive to think that
failing to address the downsides of environmental protection will
somehow make environmental protection more palatable to those
standing in the way. Moreover, just environmentalism may not require
compensation for all disproportionate burdens on the current generation
or otherwise preclude environmental measures that damage cultural or
economic interests. It would, however, require considering and perhaps
addressing those- harms that fall disproportionately on the most
vulnerable. This would not only increase the fairness of the policies but
also deprive more elite interests of the ability to strategically focus on
these sympathetic cases in pushing against environmental protection. So,
while we concede that the degree of harm to current residents will
sometimes have to be weighed against the seriousness of the
environmental problem being addressed and the extent to which the
proposed solution mitigates those adverse environmental consequences,
this does not mean that this consideration will make environmental
protection more difficult; it may in fact make it more politically feasible.
Fourth, some scholars might contend that just environmentalism is not
compelling because there are few true conflicts between the economic
interests of the vulnerable and environmental protection. 6 1 However,
many scholars who discount the possibility of such conflicts do so by
focusing on the costs and benefits of any given environmental protection
measure to the poor as a whole, discounting or ignoring entirely the harms
to particular poor individuals or communities.1 6 2 Similarly, those who
assert that there are few true conflicts often seem to focus on the long-
term well-being of the poor, discounting transition costs while, for
161. For example, Peter Wenz, an environmental ethicist who authored some of
the earliest scholarly works on environmental justice, argues that although
the environmental movement is often accused of hurting the poor and
vulnerable, cases of "genuine conflict" are "rare," and that "[m]ost cases of
apparent conflict... result from faulty analyses and correctable errors in
environmental policies." Wenz, supra note 120, at 57.
162. Thus, for example, Wenz argues that "[e]nvironmentalists generally favor
improved efficiency so that people can get what they want with less
environmental disruption," and "[i]mproving efficiency typically helps poor




example, a city develops a better public transit system or transitions to a
clean energy economy.1 63 Most importantly, scholars often dispute the
existence of conflicts between environmental protection and the economic
needs of the poor by suggesting tweaks to environmental policy that
include specific steps to address distributional inequities.1 64 Of course,
rather than being arguments against just environmentalism, these are
exactly the kind of mitigation efforts one might expect to emerge from a
robust application of just environmentalism to potential conflicts between
environmentalism and the interests of the poor.1 6 5
V. LOOKING AHEAD
The critics of environmental law have used the connection between
environmental protection and social justice to attack the environmental
movement for decades. The reason that the critics' case has proven so
salient is that there is some truth to it.
The fact that environmental protection can have some negative
consequences for vulnerable people should be conceded and, where justice
requires it, also addressed. We can and ought to expand our commitment
to justice on behalf of the vulnerable, including those who have been made
more vulnerable by the pursuit of environmental protection, even if at
times it results in a modified vision of environmental protection.
We can, and should, work toward a more just environmentalism. But
embracing the endeavor is but the first step in a difficult pursuit. Achieving
a more just environmentalism is easier said than done. Grappling with just
163. See id. at 65-66.
164. Thus, for instance, Wenz suggests that "[i]f sustainably grown food is more
expensive than most food that is currently available, the government should
increase subsidies that help poor people buy sustainably grown food. This
requirement of justice does not run afoul of any environmental agenda." Id.
at 70. In a similar vein, he argues that "most plans for species preservation in
Third World nature reserves include provision for poor people in the area to
benefit from the reserve, such as through ecotourism." Id. at 77; see also id
(arguing that if development threatens tigers in India, "justice suggests that
the people who caused and continued to benefit from the problem, people
involved in economic development, incur the loss. They, not indigenous
people, should withdraw to make room for the tigers.").
165. Indeed, Wenz himself recognizes as much, arguing that "[i]n most cases the
goals of environmentalism can be achieved in ways that do not compromise,
but in fact promote, justice." Id. at 78.
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environmentalism presents daunting challenges and raises some difficult
questions-and some of these challenges and questions are quite different
from those raised by traditional environmental justice. This concluding
Part seeks to identify those challenges and questions. We use this Part to
begin important conversations that a more just environmentalism will
require. We view it as an invitation for more in-depth conversations going
forward.
While we do not intend to start all the relevant conversations, we hope
to begin some of the most difficult. The questions we raise below include:
whose harms count, what harms count, what does justice require in this
context, and, finally, what challenges do existing institutions pose to just
environmentalism?
A. Whose Harms Count?
While many of the questions about whose harms count are common
both to environmental justice and just environmentalism, achieving just
environmentalism is going to require us to think more carefully about the
appropriate unit of analysis: whether we should consider harms to
vulnerable communities as a whole, or whether we should focus more
specifically on vulnerable individuals.
In the more traditional context, environmental justice scholars
generally agree that it is vulnerable populations-particularly racial
minorities, indigenous communities, and the poor-whose interests are
the focus of environmental justice concerns.16 6 Yet, in traditional
environmental justice problems-such as siting decisions or claims that
environmental laws are being insufficiently enforced in some areas-the
people who are harmed tend to be organized geographically. The default
unit of analysis for environmental justice, then, tends to be a
geographically defined community. Moreover, there is usually no reason to
parse this unit of analysis more finely, as everyone in the area benefits
when the air is less toxic and the water is cleaner because air and water
are quintessential public goods. If the community as a whole is considered
sufficiently vulnerable to trigger environmental justice concerns, there is
simply no need to ask whether some members of the affected community
166. Kim Allen, Vinci Daro & Dorothy C. Holland, Becoming an Environmental
Justice Activist, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note





are more vulnerable than others because all will necessarily benefit if
environmental justice is achieved.16 7
Geography, of course, continues to play an important role in
determining who is harmed under a just environmentalism assessment.
However, just environmentalism demands more flexibility in identifying
harms and in encompassing the harms to vulnerable individuals as well as
to vulnerable communities as a whole. For example, when a national
monument designation prohibits oil and mining in certain areas, the
economic interests that are harmed are likely to be located near that
monument designation. However, the costs of such conservation measures
will likely be experienced differently even by those who live in close
proximity to the resource. Frequently, what will differentiate the
experiences of different community members will be the connection
between their livelihoods and cultures and a conserved resource. Logging
bans have ripple effects that may affect entire communities, but it is the
loggers themselves (and the logging companies) who are most directly
impacted.
Just environmentalism solutions enhance the capacity to focus on
those loggers who are truly vulnerable and disadvantaged-those
surviving at the margins-because policy rather than geography can guide
our mitigation efforts. This is particularly so when we focus on monetary
harms: because money is not a public good, compensatory payments can
be targeted only to individuals who meet some threshold criteria of need
or vulnerability. We could decide, for instance, to make compensatory
payments to loggers but not logging companies, or to make payments only
to loggers living below the federal poverty line.'6 8 These choices suggest
that just environmentalism has a greater capacity to focus on individuals
167. Some members of the community-those who live in closer geographical
proximity to the polluting use-will likely benefit more if the polluter is
excluded or regulated, but that distribution of benefits is dictated by
geography, not by any particular assessment of vulnerability.
168. Of course, if the primary harms and the primary compensation take the form
of something other than money, this kind of targeted remedy might be more
difficult For example, if the loggers' primary claim of harm was to their
culture and way of life, it is more difficult to imagine how one could craft
remedies to help preserve that way of life that would exclude more affluent
loggers. However, many of the examples of just environmentalism detailed in
Part III-such as environmental taxes and subsidies-involve primarily or
only money and do not really tread on culture or other interests within
communities.
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and thus may require, or at least allow, more particularized, individual
line-drawing about who qualifies as vulnerable than in traditional
environmental justice cases, which typically focus more on the
vulnerability of affected communities as a whole. 169
The just environmentalism inquiry also asks us to examine what kind
of trade-offs between group and individual interests are appropriate and
whether the unit of analysis should be individuals or vulnerable groups as
a whole.' 70 Is it appropriate to either discount or ignore entirely the
169. That the potential for targeted, individual remedies is likely to be more
limited in cases of race than income might have consequences for whether
we pay more attention to race-based or poverty-based vulnerability, an issue
that has been hotly contested. Whether such a focus is appropriate or not is
an important question. In some ways, an inquiry into individual vulnerability
might feel unsatisfying and incomplete, as vulnerability may, in some
respects, be more contextual and more tied to community than can be
captured in case-by-case decision-making or by rules that focus on assessing
an individual's situation. However, the focus on individual vulnerability may
allow us to direct compensation where it will do the most good.
170. Of course, the question of trade-offs surfaces in traditional environmental
justice cases as well. Indeed, one criticism of the environmental justice
movement is that when advocates manage to keep an undesirable use out of
a particular neighborhood, it just ends up being built in another
neighborhood-and usually one that is also heavily minority and poor.
Faber, supra note 18, at 145. Nevertheless, these questions of trading off the
interests of some vulnerable people against the interests of others-
essentially just shifting the environmental-harm burden to a different but
similarly situated neighborhood-are usually in the background of
individual environmental justice fights and more implicit than explicit
Moreover, trade-off questions can seem less pressing in the traditional siting
context because they are often answered by asserting that the ultimate goal
of environmental justice is to decrease pollution, not just to redistribute it
See id. ("The struggle for environmental justice must be about the politics of
production per se and the elimination of the ecological threat, not just the
'fair' distribution of ecological hazards...."); see also id. ("Any attempt to
rectify distributional inequities without attacking the fundamental processes
that produce the problems in the first place focuses on symptoms rather
than causes and is therefore only a partial, temporary, and necessarily
incomplete and insufficient solution."). Thus, the competing interests of
different communities are reconciled by having less environmental harm to
distribute. In contrast, few environmentalists are likely to reconcile the
competing interests often at stake in just environmentalism by advocating




interests of at least some socially vulnerable individuals so long as the
environmental protection is good for the socially disadvantaged, taken as a
whole? A common refrain when addressing an allegation that vulnerable
people are bearing a disproportionate share of the cost of environmental
protection is that the benefits to vulnerable people as a whole outweigh
the costs being imposed on some individuals. Thus, a frequent assertion is
that a particular program actually helps the poor as a class, even though it
is quite clear that some individual poor people will be made worse off.171
The answer to this important question might well be different in
different contexts, but-in any event-this inquiry will require an
extension of existing environmental justice thought. The question provides
an opportunity to unpack more carefully what vulnerability means-and
what it ought to mean. One thing is clear: just environmentalists should
resist the facile answer that the good of the vulnerable community as a
whole always or often justifies imposing disproportionate burdens on
some truly vulnerable individuals. This approach short circuits a fuller
justice analysis and results in missed opportunities to simultaneously
alleviate burdens on vulnerable individuals and better achieve
environmental goals.
For example, in the case of net metering, many have argued that any
burden that net metering imposes on vulnerable consumers who face rate
increases is outweighed by the benefits to vulnerable people who
currently live near dirty power plants that can eventually be shuttered if
society shifts to the renewable power that net metering promotes. Thus,
they argue that current net metering programs should be retained without
adjustment for potential burdens on the poor. In California, however, more
creative solutions have emerged to allow the poor to participate more fully
in the benefits of solar power-including virtual net metering for multi-
family units, community solar programs, and subsidies for lower income
families to purchase rooftop solar panels. 1 7 2 By allowing more low-income
individuals to access the benefits of rooftop solar, these solutions promote
both justice and increased environmental protection. It is probably not a
coincidence that California's Public Utilities Commission has largely
rejected the utility industry arguments for rolling back net metering on
competing interests so much as deprive one side of the benefits that
environmental protection creates.
171. See, e.g., Wenz, supra note 120, at 64, 76.
172. See, e.g., Churchill, supra note 143.
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fairness grounds that so many other state commissions have found
persuasive.17 1
B. What Harms Count?
As we begin to grapple with just environmentalism, we must consider
not only whose harms ought to count but also what sorts of harms count.
The most obvious harm arising from environmental protection comes in a
hit to livelihoods and pocketbooks. While the political import of harms to
livelihoods is great, in many conflicts under existing environmental laws,
those costs exert little overt influence on outcomes. For example, in
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., the Court noted that the
industry groups had argued against enhanced air quality standards
because "the economic cost of implementing a very stringent standard
might produce health losses sufficient to offset the health gains achieved in
cleaning the air-for example, by closing down whole industries and
thereby impoverishing the workers and consumers dependent upon those
industries." 1 7 4 Just as quickly as the Court recognized the impact, the Court
dismissed it: "That is unquestionably true, and Congress was
unquestionably aware of it." 17s While the finding that, given the text of the
statute, economic costs of environmental protection fall outside of the
purview of administration of the law is not unusual, the political heft of
this sort of argument about economic harm remains substantial.
Arguments like this one are bound to be found almost everywhere that
environmental protection is challenged.
Economic losses, of course, are not limited simply to the loss of a
paycheck. For many communities, particularly rural communities, local
environments do a great deal to provide and supplement livelihoods. For
example, people may work as farmers, loggers, fishers, guides, hunters,
grazers, and miners. Even when a person's main work is not tied up
directly with the environment, people may use the environment to satisfy
or supplement a wide range of needs from diet to fuel to medicine. Very
frequently, the poorer a person is, the more she will rely on the
173. See Herman K. Trabish, Inside the Decision: California Regulators Preserve
Retail Rate Net Metering Until 2019, UTILITY DIVE (Feb. 1, 2016),
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/inside-the-decision-california-regulators
-preserve-retail-rate-net-meterin/413019/ [http://perma.cc/R37Y-5HV5].





environment for her livelihood, and the local environment is often
regarded as a form of community safety net.176
Harms can, of course, be much more diverse than harms to economic
well-being. Economic harms to communities of resource users can
fragment, displace, assimilate, or drive communities toward cultural
disintegration. For example, when indigenous peoples speak of harms
resulting from environmental protection policies, these harms typically
relate to interference with the tribe's relationship with the land and its
resources, or to the right of self-determination and autonomy in managing
the tribe's resources. When the government places restrictions on hunting
animals and gathering plants integral to tribal lifeways, this results not
only in loss of food security but also in loss of culture.1 " These
environmental protection measures have threatened local traditional
knowledge about when and where to access medicinal plants and herbs.1 78
These limitations can also interfere with religious or spiritual practices,1 79
as can limitations on access to particular land, which can impede access to
sacred sites and decimate identity. 18 0
Moreover, communities and cultures frequently organize around
common livelihoods. For example, almost every sort of resource extraction
has an associated community: mining communities, grazing communities,
176. Arild Angelsen et al., Environmental Income and Rural Livelihoods: A Global-
Comparative Analysis, 64 WORLD DEv. S12, S13 (2014).
177. See, e.g., Tsosie, Environmentalfustice, supra note 12, at 1625, 1645.
178. See Krakoff, supra note 12, at 214-17.
179. See, e.g., Adam Weymouth, When Global Warming Kills Your God: Twenty-
three Alaskan Tribesmen Broke the Law When They Overfished King
Salmon, but They Claim Their Faith Gave Them No Other Choice, ATLANTIC
(June 3, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/06/
when-global-warming-kills-your-god/372015 [http://perma.cc/W9L7
-7LAL] (documenting how Yup'ik tribal members violated limits on King
Salmon fishing in Alaska-limits enacted because of dwindling King Salmon
population likely caused by climate change-because they believed they
were bound "to continue their ancestral traditions" and that "[i]f Yup'ik
people do not fish for King Salmon, the King Salmon spirit will be offended
and it will not return to the river").
180. Eric Dannenmaier, Beyond Indigenous Property Rights: Exploring the
Emergence of a Distinctive Connection Doctrine, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 53, 60
(2008) ("'Indigenous peoples' own claims about their relationship to the
land make reference to spiritual and cultural concerns as well as economic
(or livelihood) concerns.").
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farming communities, and fishing communities are some familiar
examples. When environmental protection measures threaten the viability
of these extraction industries, local communities assert not only economic
harms but also harms to their way of life-to the traditions and culture
they value in their own lives and that they hope to pass on to their
children.
What should we make of losses related to a person's way of life? If just
environmentalism is to consider harms to ways of life, cultures, and
religious practices, it will have to grapple with difficult questions about
which ways of life, cultures, and religious practices count-which ones
deserve weight and protection-and how, assuming that environmental
protection is worth pursuing given these costs, to address such profound,
if sometimes intangible, losses. It may also have to confront questions
about respect for indigenous self-determination when the priorities of
indigenous peoples regarding management of their resources do not align
with environmentalists' preferences. These questions are rarely
confronted in the traditional environmental literature because most of the
harms related to siting and other quintessential environmental justice
issues are harms to interests like health and property values, which are
more easily measured and do not usually require difficult line-drawing.
Claims of damage to culture or deference to indigenous autonomy, for
example, are less common in that context.
Thus, just environmentalism will require us to address a relatively
new set of questions about whose culture should be taken into account
and why. Some scholars have suggested the difficulty of "judg[ing] among
competing cultural practices" if the criterion is not simply the
environmental effects of those practices.18 1 Grounding environmental
policy in cultural judgments made on any basis other than environmental
impact will, they claim, open the door to all kinds of claims that particular
cultural practices should be protected even when they do substantial
environmental harm:
For example, backpacking, off-road four-wheeling, recreational
vehicle "camping," and fishing are all cultural practices, but they
have different environmental consequences and should be judged
in light of those consequences, not their importance to the groups
that practice them. 18 2





Judging what kind of cultural claims-and, relatedly, what "ways of
life"-should get weight in a just environmentalism framework will be a
daunting but not impossible task. We might, for example, consider how
central the impacted practice is to the well-being and identity of
individuals or the relevant community. Indeed, we might consider whether
it is an individual or a coherent community asking for recognition of
cultural and "way of life" claims, as one might question what "culture" or
"way of life" means-or whether it has any meaning at all-in the context
of an individual instead of a wider community. We might also consider
how longstanding the cultural practices are and how intimately they are
connected to particular land or natural resources.
While it will often be extremely challenging to assess these claims,
there may be ways to craft approaches to just environmentalism solutions
that allow those asserting harms to way of life or culture to value their
own claims, rather than requiring a third-party decisionmaker to assess
either the legitimacy or value of those claims. For example, if overfishing in
a particular area risks fishery collapse, a regulator could allocate whatever
limited fishing permits it still plans to issue to the most vulnerable
fishers-for example, subsistence fishers or indigenous fishers for whom
fishing is part of their way of life-and make these permits transferable.
The individual fishers could then choose whether to keep those permits
and preserve their way of life or whether to sell them on the open
market.' 3 Stakeholders in any particular dispute might also generate
other procedures that allow individuals to value their own culture or way
of life claims.
Another question that just environmentalism requires us to clearly
confront is whether justice concerns are triggered only by harms that can
be traced to discriminatory intent or animus. In the context of traditional
environmental justice, choices about the distribution of environmental
harms are often made by decisionmakers, whom we suspect (willingly or
not) harbor some degree of prejudice, and that this prejudice (perhaps
subtly, perhaps overtly) taints the decision-making process. In contrast,
for some potential just environmentalism claims-particularly those that
arise out of natural resource conservation-this kind of discriminatory
intent is less likely to be present. This is true both because it is often
unclear in the conservation context which human populations will be
183. We recognize that this is not a perfect solution because the subsistence
fisher might lack adequate information to appropriately value the fishing
permit
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affected when the conservation decision is made and because, when the
affected parties can be identified in advance, it is often because the
decisionmaker is acting to protect a unique resource that cannot be "sited"
elsewhere. That is, the decisionmaker cannot choose which community to
burden-that consequence follows inevitably from the conservation
decision itself.
For example, assume the conservationists want to protect an
endangered species. It may well be the case that where that species is
found is only generally known at the outset, and it only becomes clear
where the species is located (and, indeed, only worth spending the
resources to make that determination) after the decisionmaker decides
that conserving that species is a priority. Within the context of U.S.
environmental law, for example, the government first determines that a
species warrants listing, and only after that decision is made does the
government turn to identifying that species' habitat. Thus, those who will
bear the burdens of species protection are usually not identifiable in
advance. Justice Scalia noted just this problem when he lamented that the
way the Endangered Species Act distributes the cost of protecting species
is both somewhat random and insensitive to imposing ruinous burdens on
the poor.1 84
Even in those conservation cases in which it is clear from the outset
what population will be affected-for example, when a new national park
or monument designation is being considered-the resource to be
conserved is often unique and its location is fixed. Just as with endangered
species, we have to protect the resources where we find them. Thus, the
decisionmaker may have only one choice-or at least a much more
constrained set of choices-about where to locate the park.1 Ss In contrast,
for the typical siting decisions about where to put a locally undesirable
land use that are the bread and butter of traditional environmental justice,
the decisionmaker often has myriad siting choices, perhaps including
siting the facility in a different state or even a different country. Does the
fact that we do not really "site" endangered species, riparian zones,
mountain ranges, or amazing natural features (such as the arches of
184. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
714 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. Of course, even when a park's location is basically fixed, there will still be
numerous decisions to be made about everything from the size of the park





Arches National Park or the peaks of Yosemite) mean that environmental
justice is less relevant to these contexts and their associated harms?
Both of these differences-the inability, in some cases, to identify
upfront who will be harmed and the fact that only particular sitings are
possible-suggest that in the just environmentalism context, particularly
for conservation-related harms, there is perhaps less reason to think that
either racial discrimination or an intent to target poor neighborhoods
influences the distribution of those harms. That said, the shifting priorities
of different eras may mean that where Native Americans were once driven
to the least arable lands, their remaining lands may be now be more
broadly valued by society as scenic, unspoiled, or culturally significant.
Lands that have gone undeveloped because of the sustainable practices or
lack of access to capital of their custodians may mean that those lands have
preserved species or features that become targets of protection. Such
cases may implicate race and culture and impose disproportionate costs
on the vulnerable.
Should these kinds of harms then "count" for environmental justice
purposes or not? While one might make a case for excluding (or at least
worrying less about) these harms that are less likely to have resulted from
racial or other discriminatory animus on the part of decisionmakers, we
believe there are strong arguments favoring consideration of such harms.
Most theories of distributive justice that inform environmental justice
care about the actual distribution of relevant costs and benefits, not
merely the intent of the decisionmaker who allocates those harms and
benefits. Disproportionate impact on vulnerable groups can itself be an
injustice. While the environmental justice movement traces its roots, in
part, to the civil rights movement, 186 and a concern with cases of
"environmental racism," or "racial discrimination in the environmental
decision-making process,"18 7 the environmental justice movement has,
over time, expanded its focus beyond discriminatory intent to consider
disparate impacts, as well.
This shift mirrors the evolution of the broader civil rights movement
toward an emphasis on the role of structural racism in creating
discriminatory impacts or effects that contribute to the continued poverty,
186. Allen et al., supra note 166, at 108.
187. Id. at 109 (tracing the idea of "environmental racism" to one of the
commonly accepted "origin stories" of environmental justice-the Warren
County protests against siting PCB disposal in predominantly poor and
African-American neighborhoods).
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health risks, and obstacles to social mobility faced by the vulnerable and
communities of color.1 88 The civil rights movement in particular has tried
to expose the role that built-in structural forces play in stacking the deck
against the poor and communities of color and in fostering the underlying
vulnerability that exacerbates the burdens experienced by environmental
justice communities. Once we acknowledge that past injustices play a
major role in current vulnerability, the need to demonstrate
discriminatory intent in particular cases wanes and the opportunity to
redress discriminatory impacts opens.
Additionally, sometimes the kinds of disproportionate impacts on
vulnerable people will be relatively easy to predict-even if it's not clear
exactly which people will be impacted-so measures to remedy those
likely injustices can reasonably be developed at the outset. For example,
since at least the 1930s, the parties subject to treaties on international
whaling law have included particular exemptions for certain indigenous
cultures, though the scope of the specific whales included and the breadth
of the exemption have ebbed and flowed over time. 89 Interestingly, the
exemptions over time have recognized not only the subsistence needs of
indigenous cultures for whales but also the cultural and spiritual
significance of whaling.190 We find a similar allowance for subsistence
hunting and gathering for native Alaskans in the Endangered Species
Act.19 1
C. What MightJustice Look Like in Just Environmentalism?
One question that has received significant attention in environmental
justice literature is: what does environmental justice mean? As mentioned
in Section IV.A, the environmental justice literature generally conceives of
environmental justice in both procedural and substantive (or distributive)
terms. Both of these aspects of justice are likewise central to just
environmentalism and will be explored in this Section.
188. This shift has occurred even as the Supreme Court has limited constitutional
equal protection claims to those that can prove discriminatory intent See,
e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
189. Anne M. Creason, Culture Clash: The Influence of Indigenous Cultures on the
International WhalingRegime, 35 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 83, 84-86 (2004).
190. DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1066 (4th ed. 2011).





Most conceptions of procedural justice focus on giving affected parties
some kind of voice in the decision-making process that affects their
interests. When those who will experience the harm cannot be readily
identified at the outset, opportunities for participatory justice may be
much more limited because we cannot easily ascertain who should be
given information, input, and influence in the initial decision-making
process. In these situations, procedural justice may be possible only at a
remedial stage, after harms become clear. While participation in the
crafting of remedies, including potential compensation or mitigation
measures, is better than no participation at all, it may be less desirable
because, once a program is already in place or well underway, there may
be less flexibility or political will to develop and implement remedies.
In many just environmentalism contexts, however, affected parties can
be effectively identified at the outset of the process. In these situations,
approaches to participatory justice might be viewed along a spectrum,
ranging from giving affected parties information about how their interests
may be affected, to giving those parties some opportunity to be heard in
the process, to formally recognizing parties as stakeholders and giving
them a seat at the negotiating table, to granting them decisional autonomy
(akin to veto power) over the ultimate decision.
In practice, questions about the extent of participation that just
environmentalism requires will often look similar to those that arise in
traditional environmental justice contexts. These questions are generally
well explored in the literature,192 so we will not spend much time on them
here. One facet of procedural justice that deserves fuller exploration,
however, is the question of when and under what circumstances it might
be appropriate to grant groups decisional autonomy.
Consider, for example, a scenario in which the federal government
wished to protect the magnificent Havasupai Falls, located on the
Havasupai Tribe's reservation, by annexing it into nearby Grand Canyon
National Park. Would participatory justice require that the Tribe have
decisional autonomy over this decision-the absolute right to veto the
federal government's proposal? There are at least two strong reasons that
192. See Eileen Guana, The EnvironmentalJustice Misfit: Public Paricipation and
the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1998) (providing a broad
overview of administrative law theory and how this theory harmonizes and
conflicts with various forms of participation that might be used to pursue
environmental justice).
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suggest that it would: first, the tribes have sovereignty over their own
lands and resources that must be respected; and second, the importance of
the land to tribal culture and lifeways would be so difficult to value, and its
loss so incalculable, that the sounder approach would be to put tribes in
control of that valuation by affirming their property right in their land.
As this analysis suggests, we might frame the choice of whether to
grant a party decisional autonomy as a choice between liability rules
(where an outside entity assesses values) and property rules (where the
harmed entity itself decides whether or not to enter into a transaction).9
So understood, one major question in implementing just
environmentalism is when it makes sense to use a property rule instead of
a liability rule. A number of factors potentially inform this choice, including
what parties are impacted, the relationship between the parties, and
whether a party's sovereignty is implicated. Such determinations may also
turn on the nature of the harm suffered, the degree of suffering, and
whether such harms are quantifiable or easily measured.
One reason for employing property rules is that we think third-parties
(such as courts or other institutions) lack the capacity to effectively value a
right or interest.1 94 When an affected party is given decisional autonomy,
the harm does not occur unless whatever compensation and other
reparations are offered are enough to entice the harmed party's consent.
When one employs this kind of property rule, we would expect that the
price of consent is a fair price unless there is reason to believe that consent
was coerced, corrupted, or obtained by fraudulent methods.
The difficulty of court or other third-party valuation of tribal interests
in their land is illustrated by the historic dispute between the United States
and the Great Sioux Nation-Lakota, Nakota, and Dakota peoples-over
the Black Hills. While conflicts between the federal government and the
Great Sioux Nation are of long standing, this dispute regarding ownership
of the Black Hills stems from the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie.19 s The Black
193. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092
(1972) ("An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that
someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it
from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is
agreed upon by the seller.... Whenever someone may destroy the initial
entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an
entitlement is protected by a liability rule.").
194. See, e.g., id at 1125-27.




Hills are deeply sacred to the Sioux Nations and include the site of the
tribes' creation.1 96 While the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie required that
three-fourths of male tribal members agree to any subsequent changes to
reservation boundaries, which included the seven million acres of the
Black Hills, the federal government seized the Black Hills in the 1868
Treaty of Fort Laramie under dubious circumstances and without
satisfying the earlier treaty's conditions for changing reservation
boundaries.
In 1980, the Supreme Court heard the longstanding claim brought by
the Oglala Sioux, in which the Tribe argued that the Black Hills had been
stolen from them in violation of the agreements between the Tribe and the
United States, as implemented by the Act of February 28, 1877.198 The
Court agreed and ordered that they be compensated.' 9 9 About $100
million was set aside for the Sioux, but they did not want compensation:
they wanted the Black Hills. 20 0 Either the Sioux felt that no price would be
enough or, at the very least, they did not want to sell their interest in the
Black Hills at that price. By most accounts, the Sioux believed that the
Black Hills were "not for sale."2 0 1
Today, the Pine Ridge Reservation, home to the Oglala Lakota and
adjacent to the Black Hills, is plagued by a staggering 49.7% rate of
poverty according to the Census Bureau's American Community Survey 5-
year estimate.202 In the meantime, the trust account for the compensation
196. See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Priceless Property 29 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 685, 701-
02 (2013).
197. Id. at 698-99.
198. SiouxNation, 448 U.S. at 374-84.
199. Id
200. See Carlson, supra note 196, at 688-89.
201. See, e.g., Tom Cook, If They're Not for Sale, What Are the Black Hills For?,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept 4, 2016), http://newsmaven.io/indiancountry
today/archive/if-they-re-not-for-sale-what-are-the-black-hills-for-gU4P7slB
IESviPIGpE81QA [http://perma.cc/9KS3-HMZ9].
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award has grown to around $1.3 billion.20 s The Sioux still refuse to accept
the compensation. The award provided by the Court represents a liability
award-fair-market value regardless of whether or not the harmed party
wants to sell. The heart of the Sioux's claim, however, was that they have a
property right in the Black Hills that they cannot be forced to surrender,
even if they are compensated for the loss. The fact that the Sioux still have
not collected the award illustrates not only the holdout issue that property
rules can create but also the potential wisdom of employing property rules
when third-parties are incapable of correctly valuing the harm-perhaps
because, to the property holder, that value is incalculable.2 0 4
That is not to suggest, however, that everyone who asserts a difficult-
to-value interest in an existing way of life should be given decisional
autonomy over proposed environmental protection measures. Context
clearly matters. Generally, property rights are far from absolute: they do
not guarantee the right to say no when the government comes knocking
and wishes to regulate or purchase your underlying right. However, when
the harmed party is, or is at least represented by, a different sovereign
(e.g., another country or a recognized tribe) than the party causing the
harm, we will often find that the harmed party can make a strong
argument for at least a degree of decisional autonomy.
In many respects Tribes are the easiest hard case-in part because
they are co-sovereigns, even if they are not full sovereigns. Nevertheless,
they do provide a bookend from which we can potentially reason about
how much participation procedural justice requires in other contexts.20 5
203. Why the Sioux Are Refusing $1.3 Billion, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 24, 2011, 3:57
PM) http://www.pbs.org/newshour/arts/north-america-july-decl1-black
hills_08-23 [http://perma.cc/C3F6-4MN8].
204. In most instances, holdout claims vis-A-vis the government can be solved by
eminent domain. How that works in the context of treaty obligations is much
less clear.
205. Some might argue that even in the tribal context, decisional autonomy
should not always be honored. In Subsection III.B, we discussed how
members of the Skull Valley Goshute fought to site nuclear waste disposal on
the tribe's reservation and how Congress thwarted that proposal by creating
a wilderness area around the reservation, thus making it impossible to build
the transportation infrastructure to haul in the nuclear waste. This is a
situation that could be framed as a classic example of both traditional
environmental justice and the sort of just environmentalism we discuss in
this Article. On the one hand, it could be argued that even though the Skull





Of course, justice in the context of just environmentalism does not
refer solely to procedural justice. Concerns of substantive justice-
particularly distributive justice-also arise. Like issues of procedural
justice, distributive justice questions can arise at the initial decision-
making phase if it is clear that the likely distribution of harms will unduly
burden the vulnerable or can arise later as a policy is implemented and its
effects become clearer. Whenever it appears that the vulnerable will bear a
disproportionate share of the costs of the environmental protection,
distributive justice might call for attempts to alleviate those burdens by
mitigating the harm caused or, perhaps, trying to provide some sort of
compensation or reparations for the harm suffered.
Of course, this formulation requires us to decide at the outset what it
means for a vulnerable group to bear a disproportionate share of the
harms of environmental protection. That is, we must decide exactly when
distributive justice concerns are triggered. Thus far, we have spoken
primarily of "disproportionate" burdens on the poor, but one could
potentially make the case that any burden on the poor is disproportionate
because they start from a disadvantaged position. Disproportionate in
reservation, given the Tribe's vulnerability and lack of other development
options, it would be an injustice to let the siting go forward because it is a
history of unrelenting injustice that .put the Skull Valley Goshutes in a
position where they would make such a choice. That is, prior injustices have
so constrained the Tribe's choices that the Tribe's consent cannot be treated
as effective and valid, or at least final. See Endres, supra note 91, at 929-30.
Furthermore, the siting decision must be viewed in the "broader system of
environmental injustices against Native Americans, particularly nuclear
colonialism"-including "decades of toxic exposure from Department of
Defense experiments with toxic and biological warfare" that have devastated
the reservation economically and environmentally and left the tribe with few
viable avenues for economic development. Id. On the other hand, we could
look at the thwarting of the Tribe's autonomy as a paternalistic imposition of
forced environmentalism that perpetrated a new injustice against the Skull
Valley Goshutes by preventing them from pursuing economic development
opportunities in a way the Tribe saw fit. Indeed, putting aside whether they
would agree with our arguments in this Article, some scholars would likely
argue that the consent of the Tribe's sovereign government obviates any
potential environmental justice issue. See, e.g., Krakoff, supra note 29, at 163
("Environmental Justice for tribes must be consistent with the promotion of
tribal self-governance.").
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other situations might mean something more like "regressive," in either
the absolute sense (that the absolute burden borne by poor individuals
exceeds the absolute burden borne by more affluent individuals) or in a
more relative sense (that, for example, as a percentage of income, the
burden will consume a higher percentage of the poor's more limited
budget).2 06
As Part IV suggests, we might also evaluate disproportionality in terms
of the disconnect between the burdens of environmental protection that
the vulnerable are asked to bear and their contribution to the underlying
environmental problem.20 7 In most cases, this disproportionality will be
206. One might also view burdens on the poor as regressive even if they are
equivalent in either absolute or percentage terms to those borne by the rich
because the declining marginal utility of money means that those dollars are
more valuable to the poor.
207. Alternatively, in some situations, one might also evaluate whether an
environmental protection harm falls disproportionality on the vulnerable by
considering whether there is a mismatch between that burden and the
extent to which that vulnerable group will benefit from the environmental
protection measure. There are some situations, for example, in which the
same vulnerable people are both harmed more and benefitted more than
others. For example, in the pollution control context, if a state regulator
blocks the siting of a factory in a vulnerable neighborhood because that
factory would have greatly exacerbated the neighborhood's air pollution
burden, neighborhood residents are most hurt by that decision-because
they lose potential employment opportunities-and most benefitted by that
decision because they avoid breathing dirtier air. The same kinds of
questions also arise in the conservation context, although the time-scale for
incurring the costs and garnering the benefits may be quite different. For
example, a temporary hunting ban on a threatened species or fishing
restrictions in a local fishery in danger of collapse because of overfishing will
likely harm the local subsistence hunters and fishers most but, at least in the
long term, may benefit those same locals most once the populations have
been sufficiently restored to allow for subsistence use.
How ought we to treat these situations? Do we offset the harms and
benefits-concluding that if the same vulnerable people are both harmed in
greater measure and benefitted in greater measure then there is no
disproportionate burden and therefore that no remedy, whether
compensation or mitigation of harms, is required? Is the answer the same in
the conservation example in which the harms are relatively certain and the
benefits are both delayed and more speculative because restoration efforts
may not succeed and because the subsistence fisher may not be able to ride




readily apparent, as vulnerable groups usually have smaller environmental
footprints than more affluent communities.2 0
In a few situations, however, it might be the case that the vulnerable
people who are most harmed by a particular environmental protection
measure also contributed disproportionately to the environmental
degradation that the measure is designed to remedy. For example, a
particular species might be driven to near extinction by subsistence
hunters who have few, if any, other viable sources of food. The poor may
engage in slash-and-burn agriculture that decimates forests because they
do not have access to artificial fertilizers that might enable them to use
their existing fields productively year after year. In these situations, does
justice not require any consideration of their harms when governments
ban hunting the endangered species or ban slash-and-burn practices? Or,
in an example more likely to occur domestically, would just
environmentalism require anything if a carbon tax falls hardest on low-
income individuals who drive older, less efficient cars? It is true both that
the poor are more likely to drive such cars because of financial constraints
and that, by driving those cars, the poor may produce more
transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions, at least if we focus on
car travel alone.
The answer to the question of what justice requires in these
circumstances may turn, in part, on whether causation is equated with
culpability. We might judge contributions to a problem differently if they
new life and livelihood elsewhere without real hope of return, even if
restoration eventually succeeds?
If we do choose to offset costs and benefits (or treat being particularly
burdened and particularly benefited essentially as canceling each other out),
we would then have to think more carefully about what we mean by more
benefited or more harmed. In the takings context, courts have sometimes
distinguished between "general benefits" and "private benefits" when
deciding whether an exercise of eminent domain creates a particular, private
benefit to the landowner that should be offset against (e.g., deducted from)
the amount the government owes her in just compensation. See, e.g.,
Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013) (holding that a
local government's taking of a strip of the landowner's beachfront property
to construct dunes to prevent flooding provided a private flood control
benefit for the homeowner, not merely a generalized societal benefit, and
thus that benefit could be valued and deducted from the compensation
owed). That kind of analysis may have some applicability here.
208. See sources cited supra notes 129-130.
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are driven by greed than if they are driven by desperate poverty and the
pressing need to keep families fed, clothed, and able to get to work. If the
vulnerable make choices that are more damaging to the environment
precisely because they are vulnerable, we might recognize that those
choices cause more harm, but that those choices are also severely
constrained by the practical realities of living at the margins and are
therefore, perhaps, less culpable.
This reduced culpability might seem particularly relevant to the justice
analysis if we recognize that vulnerability is often driven more by
structural forces that impose disparate burdens on the poor and racial
minorities than by individual decisions and actions. Indeed, one of the
reasons that distributive justice suggests that we should not impose higher
costs of environmental protection on the poor is that they are already
disadvantaged and that disadvantage usually stems at least as much from
societal forces as from individual choice. In some ways then, we have
circled back to the question of whether any burden on the poor is
disproportionate. While these questions will undoubtedly require more
exploration and theorizing, we would suggest that contributions to
environmental problems driven by poverty and vulnerability shaped by
larger structural forces should be discounted (or perhaps ignored
entirely) when assessing whether the burdens environmental protection
inflicts on the poor are disproportionate.
Just as it may sometimes be difficult to sort out whether we can fairly
view the vulnerable as responsible for the harm that the environmental
protection addresses, we will also have to determine whether the harms
that allegedly flow from the environmental protection are fairly
attributable to the environmental protection itself. For example, if
struggling coal miners allege that they will (or have) lost their jobs
because of new clean air regulations, we will have to determine if that job
loss is actually "caused" by the new environmental regulations or whether
the job loss is attributable instead to other facts, such as the falling price of
natural gas (a competitor fuel). In a similar vein, some scholars have
argued that the loss of Pacific Northwest logging jobs that is often blamed
on regulations designed to "protect the northern spotted owl" was, in fact,
"due mostly to the movement of wood mills from the United States to
Japan."2 09
209. Wenz, supra note 120, at 76 ("Restrictions on logging to protect the northern





A variation on this problem that is perhaps even more complex-
theoretically if not factually-is how to treat objections to just
environmentalism compensation claims that allege that no compensation
is due because the asserted harms were inevitable. For example, one might
claim that consumer demand for cleaner energy would eventually have put
coal miners out of business in any event or that the rate of logging was
unsustainable and loggers would likewise have inevitably lost their jobs.
Does the inevitability of a harm due to other factors obviate any justice
claim for mitigation or compensation? The inevitability objection might be
evaluated by considering factors such as how far out the "inevitable" job
loss was, how much the environmental regulations accelerated that loss,
and whether any compensation should thus be limited to harms
necessitated by the earlier transition to another job. Many questions
remain, of course. Are cultural harms that were "inevitable" still
compensable, if part of what makes those harms so serious is the likely
permanence of those cultural losses? Or do we value the time that a
community might have enjoyed its culture that has now been cut short?
How can we predict whether the job transition would be cheaper and
easier now than in a few years? More broadly, there are good reasons to be
cautious about claims that loss of culture or a way of life is inevitable.
Much of U.S. national park policy, for example, was grounded in the very
troubling notion that indigenous people and cultures were inevitably going
to disappear and that "hastening this inevitable" transition was not a cause
for concern. 2 1 0
Just environmentalism may also push us to consider a wider range of
potential remedies than environmental law has typically contemplated. If
environmental law begins to consider and account for just
environmentalism concerns, trying to address them will both complicate
and expand the reach of environmental law. For example, in 1990, Senator
Robert Byrd urged Congress to authorize $500 million in financial and job
retraining assistance to West Virginia coal miners who would lose their
jobs as a result of the Clean Air Act Amendments then before Congress.21 1
Senator Byrd's amendment to the bill ultimately failed,2 12 but one might
color his proposal as a bill seeking not just job retention or even
210. Krakoff, supra note 12, at 237-38.
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congressional pork for his constituents, but rather reparations in service
of a more just environmentalism.
Indeed, depending on which harms we decide count for just
environmentalism, just environmentalism may cause this same bleed of
environmental law into policy areas usually thought to be far afield from
environmental issues in a wide variety of contexts and circumstances.
Consider, for example, the extreme case of an indigenous population that is
displaced by environmental protection policies, as has happened in the
establishment of so many national parks both in the United States and
internationally. The harms of removal may include harm to traditional
livelihoods, homelands, diet, culture, sacred sites, traditional burial
grounds, and so on. In the context of removal of indigenous peoples from
traditional homelands threatened by climate change, Professor Rebecca
Tsosie characterizes the threat as "genocidal" and argues that
compensation measures will fail to address the seriousness of the
harms.2 1 3 Still, the effort to address these harms might seek to maximize
the prerogatives and self-determination of indigenous communities and
could include coordinating efforts to provide jobs or job training or
compensation focused on education, recreation, health care, food security,
housing, and on and on.
Once we open up the possibility of trying to compensate those
suffering from environmental protection, we open up the possibility that
environmental law and policy will have to engage more fully with a wider
range of human concerns. Such an expansion returns to the roots of
environmental justice, which merged environmental concerns with
broader concerns about civil rights, education, housing, employment, and
health.2 14
3. Examples of Application
In Part III, we laid out three broad categories of just environmentalism
challenges-those related to conservation, pollution, and environmental
taxes. In this Subpart, we provide an illustration of how just
environmentalism would cause us to rethink some of the examples
introduced above. For each of the examples we take up, we ask the
questions that our just environmentalism framework suggests we ought:
what are the relevant communities of special concern; what constitutes
213. See Tsosie, Environmental Justice, supra note 12, at 1625.




harm in each particular context; and, what would justice require in each
circumstance? As this discussion demonstrates, addressing these
questions does not provide easy answers, but it helps frame the issues for
decisionmakers so as to enhance the likelihood of a more just result. In the
Subsections that follow, we apply the just environmentalism framework to
three illustrative scenarios: the founding of Yellowstone National Park,
dealing with risks exposed and posed by the BP Spill, and the designing of
a carbon tax for Washington State.
a. Reimagining Yellowstone National Park
As mentioned in Part III, the creation of many protected areas and the
decision to protect particular species precipitates the displacement of
human livelihoods, homes, and a wide range of other interests. Because it
is frequently the case that the poor rely heavily on the natural resources
around them, the decision to protect landscapes and species will exact a
great deal from those already most vulnerable.
Taking one of the protected areas examples explored in Part III, we
briefly consider how just environmentalism might have made a difference
in the decisions relating to Yellowstone National Park. In order to establish
the Park, the U.S. government banished and eradicated Native Americans
from the Park.
A first order question the U.S. government would have had to address
if it had embraced just environmentalism was whether a community of
concern was implicated in the decision to create Yellowstone. The answer
to this question is straightforward-the Tribes who at the time lived in
and looked to Yellowstone to sustain their way of life are, indeed, a
potential community of concern. At that time, what became Yellowstone
was not occupied by non-indigenous people, although a very small number
of entrepreneurs had tried to establish businesses in the area based on
their belief in the healing potential of Yellowstone's hot springs.2 1S The
number of entrepreneurs, however, was small and may have even post-
dated the creation of the park.
We next ask, what constitutes harm in this context? In this context,
establishing harm is not difficult; instead, what is difficult is determining
where to stop counting harm. There is little ambiguity about what
happened and how it negatively impacted the tribes. The tribes were
215. Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L.
515, 552-54 (1997).
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evicted from the park. How should this harm be identified, quantified, or
calculated? Loss of land? Interference with tribal autonomy? Loss of
shelter and vital subsistence and medicinal resources? Disruption of
migration patterns? Loss of hunting? Loss of access to sacred sites and
place-based rituals? Interference with livelihoods? Loss of enjoyment of
the beauty of nature that the United States had determined it would
instead protect and promote for its own citizens? While the answers to
these questions are far from clear, just environmentalism nonetheless
demands that decisionmakers grapple with these very questions.
We next ask, what would justice look like in this context? We first note
that we could avoid all harm and issues of proper mitigation if the conflicts
with indigenous people could have been avoided. Arguably, they could
have been, at least to a large extent, particularly in Yellowstone's early
days. After all, the area designated as Yellowstone had co-existed for
millennia with sustainable Native American use. Still, it is likely that some
conflicts could not have been completely avoided given that the park's new
mission was not only to preserve Yellowstone but also to provide access to
visitors. Certainly, as time progressed and the number of visitors and uses
multiplied, conflicts would have proved unavoidable, and the tribes would
have been curtailed in their various uses of the region.
Assuming that conflicts could not be avoided, we move on to think
about how different framings of justice might apply in this situation. From
a procedural justice perspective, the tribes that had used Yellowstone for
generations would be in a strong position to insist on participation, if not
some degree of autonomous decision-making, about the future of the park.
Thus, where conflicts could not be avoided, the U.S. government would
need to enter into talks with the tribes about whether the park would be
created at all and about how harms could be mitigated. While this give and
take seems difficult, it is similar to problems the park faces in dealing with
conflicts with other government agencies and state and local governments,
each with their own degree of autonomy over some decisions related to
the park.
Even if the tribes were not provided a degree of autonomy, they would
nonetheless have to be provided information to help understand the
decisions being made, as well as the ability to participate, provide input,
and be consulted throughout the decision-making process. Ideally, the
government and the tribes would have come to an agreement that, at the
very least, would not have left the tribes any worse off because of the
creation and operation of the park. Depending on how the tribe valued
potential opportunities associated with the park, there is a chance that
they could have reached a just and mutually satisfactory situation. If an




Yellowstone. More likely, it would have meant a different Yellowstone than
the one we have today-but potentially a more just Yellowstone.
Had it wished to respect tribal autonomy or at least provide tribal
input and participation, the United States would still have had significant
leverage to induce tribal cooperation with park management at the time of
the park's creation. In considering this, remember both that the U.S.
government was willing to give the railroads that would service
Yellowstone every other section of property on public lands (640 acres
each) for miles along each side.of newly built railroad track in order to
induce the railroad to lay more rail and that the U.S. government had set
up offices around the country to give land away to potential homesteaders.
Thus, even with tribal participation and input, the outcome of no park at
all, though possible, seems unlikely.
Even in a difficult negotiation, a different sort of park, one that gave up
on the ideal of nature untouched and embraced the idea of some human
influence in the park, along with some sort of compensation, seems the
most likely outcome.
Whatever the initial decision, an agreement that invited or imagined a
degree of tribal co-management may have inured to the great benefit of
the United States had they sought it. Conflicts over fire suppression would
have been addressed much earlier given the Native American practice at
the time of burning in conjunction with hunting. The decimation of the
wolf and bear populations would have implicated the interests of the
tribes, as would their reintroduction. It is hard to imagine exactly how
these and many other issues would have played out, but the just
environmentalism exercise of considering some of these interests and
reimagining how they might have been addressed goes a long way in not
only providing a tangible example of just environmentalism in practice but
also in detailing the failures of the status quo.
b. Rethinking the BP Spill Response
In Part III, we also mentioned that pollution abatement is a second
category of circumstances where just environmentalism may help address
the myriad of problems that arise. Any effort to reduce pollution has the
potential to impose economic consequences, and often vulnerable
populations pay a disproportionate share of those costs. In that Part and in
the beginning of this Article, we discussed the common perception in New
Orleans after the BP spill that the offshore oil production moratorium put
in place by President Obama exacerbated the economic turmoil in the
region.
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Would a sensitivity to just environmentalism have altered the
moratorium on offshore oil production? If so, how? In determining
whether we have a just environmentalism problem, we first ask whose
harms ought to count and if there is a community of concern. Some aspects
of identifying communities of concern are easy, but other aspects are quite
challenging. It seems obvious, for example, that just environmentalism
would care very little for the economic consequences of the moratorium
suffered by the world's largest oil companies-like BP-that are actively
producing oil off the Atlantic shore. But what about the employees of those
companies? Just environmentalism's focus on vulnerable populations
would most likely lead us to consider-at most-harms to a subset of
those employed by the same companies. The managers, engineers,
technological experts, lawyers, and the large number of other
professionals employed by the oil industry do not manifest any particular
vulnerability and would not be considered vulnerable populations. That
said, the moratorium might push some employed in lower wage jobs over
the economic edge. The communities potentially impacted do not stop
there, but expanding the circle of communities of concern too broadly
quickly poses challenges of administrative and political feasibility. So, we
see that line drawing is going to be difficult in this context. For example, in
thinking about the economic costs that resulted from the moratorium,
should we consider those employed by contractors and subcontractors
relied upon by the industry? What about those who rely on business from
companies themselves and their workers? Or, what about those who
would now compete for prospective work with those without work due to
the moratorium? The ripple effects of economic harm are extremely
complex and difficult to identify at a granular level.
Once we have identified a meaningful population of concern, we next
move on to ask, what harms should just environmentalism care about? The
most obvious harms, of course, are those related to income. Should just
environmentalism also concern itself with employment benefits, such as
health insurance and retirement security? What about food security,
particularly given that the BP spill decimated fisheries in the area? In
addition to various categories of harm, we might have to confront
questions about the temporal nature of any harm suffered. For example,
while decisionmakers might consider economic replacement for lost labor
opportunities, where might those measures end? What if, for example,
people have a hard time finding a job again even after the moratorium is
lifted? At what point should a line be drawn that separates the harm
arising from the moratorium from other contributors that make it difficult




Once we have a handle on the relevant populations of concern and
harms that ought to be redressed, we next ask what just environmentalism
might look like in this context.
Again, finding ways to avoid that harm to the community of concern
would greatly simplify the analysis of this question. Could the harm be
avoided here? Of course, the most straightforward way to avoid economic
harm from the moratorium would have been to refuse to impose the
moratorium in the first place. However, given the importance of concerns
beyond the economic implications-such as the need to assess and
mitigate the environmental risks associated with the spill, the desire to
reduce the risk of having to deal with more than a single spill at a time, the
imperative of investigating how the BP oil spill happened and whether
other wells in the region posed similar risks, and the responsibility to
protect resources and workers going forward-it seems very likely that
even if the principle of just environmentalism guided the decision, the
moratorium or something like it would have been put in place.
Could the moratorium have been put in place without harming the
most vulnerable in society? It seems impossible to construct a moratorium
that would keep the vulnerable working. And the further downstream in
the economy one reaches in identifying communities of concern, the more
implausible it seems.
We might then turn to questions of mitigation. If the moratorium is
thought to be only necessary in the short term, this might lead us to think
about options like income replacement and the possibility of offering some
other substitute for employment income lost due to the moratorium. In the
case of the BP spill, this might mean, for example, providing displaced
workers preferential employment opportunities in the spill clean up.216
This, of course, does not come without controversy because the spill itself
harms so many aspects of the economy (e.g., tourism and fisheries). If the
moratorium is thought to be a long-term policy, the government might
think about implementing job retraining programs or investing in placing
more government employment opportunities in the affected area.
216. Of course, we recognize that measures designed to compensate those
harmed by environmental protection cannot be taken in a vacuum and will
affect the incentives and actions of other parties in ways that may ultimately
offset the intended social justice benefits. For example, if the government
provides displaced workers with replacement income or employment
opportunities, BP itself might be less inclined to provide compensation to
those workers.
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Procedural justice's pull on this situation increases as the scope of
problems mitigated increases. For example, if the moratorium is
determined to be very short term, one might think of income replacement
for a vulnerable population suffering harm without much feedback from
that community. If, however, decisionmakers begin to contemplate, for
example, retraining workers for other industries, the strength of the claim
that justice requires fuller participation for those affected by the program
grows enormously.
c. Developing a Just Carbon Tax
In some respects, the easiest category of environmental protection
measures to reimagine within a just environmentalism framework are
those environmental taxes, subsidies, and mandates that make important
goods and services more expensive for the poor. Identifying the vulnerable
people who are economically burdened by a gasoline tax or a more
comprehensive carbon tax, for instance, may be relatively straightforward,
although we must still decide who is sufficiently burdened and who is
sufficiently vulnerable that justice requires some kind of compensation.
Because the harm is economic, however, it should be relatively easy to
quantify that harm and to craft a compensation mechanism.
What, then, might justice look like in this context? Recent attempts in
Washington State to pass an initiative imposing a general carbon tax
suggest that procedural justice concerns loom large for affected
communities, even-or perhaps especially-when there seems to be a
myriad of potential mitigation measures available to satisfy substantive
justice. A proposed initiative that would have made Washington the first
state in the United States to adopt a carbon tax was defeated, in part
because of opposition by social justice groups. The initiative contained
substantive measures, including a one-percent state sales tax reduction
and funding for the "working families tax rebate," that together would
likely have "more than offset the otherwise regressive pocketbook impact
of the carbon tax on the lowest-income quintile. 21 7 The social justice
groups objected, however, because they wanted more of the money
generated by the tax to go to local infrastructure improvements in low-
217. David Roberts, The Left vs. a Carbon Tax: The Odd, Agonizing Political Battle






income communities and communities of color and, more fundamentally,
because the environmental groups driving the initiative had failed to
engage social justice groups in the drafting of the initiative and, instead,
had "present[ed] them with a fait accompli, asking them to sign on to a
policy that a roomful of mostly white wonks had determined was in their
best interests." 2 18
That a potentially ground-breaking carbon tax, which-in principle-
had widespread support, stumbled because of these procedural justice
concerns underscores the need to give affected communities and
individuals a voice in the processes that develop both environmental
protection measures generally and the more specific measures intended to
address regressive effects on vulnerable people. Even when substantive
justice measures are comparatively easy to craft, neglecting procedural
justice-neglecting to give affected parties a voice in crafting those
measures-not only omits an important component of the justice calculus
but risks alienating those communities and jeopardizes their political
support for the underlying environmental protection measures.
D. What Challenges Do Existing Institutions Pose to Just
Environmentalism?
Assuming that just environmentalism requires some sort of action, one
issue that will need to be confronted is how this will fit with existing
institutions.
Interestingly, international institutions have taken the lead when it
comes to just environmentalism. In most instances, international
environmental institutions and law have lagged behind their domestic
counterparts, at least for developed countries. What makes just
environmentalism different? While the answers are far from certain, we
propose a few plausible explanations. First, because individual countries
are represented in the international realm, differences between countries
matter. The differences between the mainly developed countries of the
northern hemisphere and the developing countries of the southern
hemisphere have resulted in many important discussions about the plight
of the poor and about the different capacities and preferences for
environmental protection in rich and poor countries. Second, international
law really only works with the cooperation of countries exercising their
collective sovereignty. When environmentalism has negative impacts on a
218. Id
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country, that country generally can withhold its consent to be governed by
international legal conventions. The problem of such holdouts might have
accelerated the evolution of just environmentalism at the international
level. A third possible explanation is that because international institutions
are not as well developed and entrenched as the domestic institutions of
many countries, there is more flexibility for international law and
institutions to evolve to address emerging concerns.
One realm in which we have seen evolution to protect local and
indigenous people from negative consequences of environmental
protection is in climate change policy. When mitigating greenhouse gas
emissions, it is often cheaper to protect and restore forests that act as
greenhouse gas sinks than it is to reduce emission streams. Additionally,
many in the international community see protecting the world's
rainforests-their resources and biodiversity-as a valuable co-benefit of
climate change mitigation. The political pressure to save these forests
along with the potential to make headway on climate change more cheaply
created significant international momentum to incorporate forest
protection and restoration into international climate change efforts.
With implementation of this strategy came political push back from
local communities, indigenous people, and interest groups who advocated
for the welfare of these groups. As it turned out, the original negotiations
at the global level did not contend with the problems people who lived
around and in the forests would face if their access to the forest and its
resources were curbed. These impacts are varied and frequently severe.
Reducing use of forest land for agriculture could heighten local food
insecurity by reducing the amount of land used for agriculture. This would
not only reduce some individuals' ability to grow food but also reduce the
local supply of agricultural products, which typically increases the price of
food. Protecting forests may also mean less harvesting of foods available
within the forest, which affects local populations and could severely impair
the livelihoods and cultures of any hunter-gathering populations.
Moreover, once there is an incentive (such as income) associated with
leaving a forest alone, we create a strong incentive for states and private
owners to assert exclusive ownership over lands that were previously
treated as common-pool resources. This has resulted in local and
indigenous people being dispossessed of and restricted from lands they
previously enjoyed.
To address these concerns, the states working on climate change have
agreed on several sets of principles that seek to provide participatory
rights along with general guidelines (e.g., projects should not result in food
insecurity) and commitments for compensation where harm cannot be




accomplished some of what they set out to do. 2 19 International law also
has other norms, mentioned in Section II.B.1, including sustainable
development, that demonstrate at least some commitment to make
environmentalism more just for the most vulnerable populations.
Within U.S. domestic law, however, we have not seen as much
movement. Indeed, in many contexts, existing environmental institutions
are specifically prohibited from considering the economic costs of
environmental protection at all, much less the distribution of those costs.
At the federal level, for example the EPA is barred from considering
economic feasibility when, under the Clean Air Act, it sets national ambient
air quality standards (NAAQS), 220 when deciding whether it will approve
state implementation plans (SIPs), 2 2 1 or in setting national emission
standards for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAPs). 22 2 Most Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulations of the treatment,
storage, and disposal of solid hazardous waste likewise prohibit
consideration of costs. 2 2 3 Similarly, the Fish and Wildlife Service cannot
consider costs when it determines whether to list an endangered
species.22 4 Nor does the Army Corps of Engineers consider the economic
219. For example, an impressive social science research project that tried to track
how the REDD+ process worked on the ground in Madagascar found that
those who lived in the most inaccessible places often failed to receive the
benefits and protections promised by REDD+. See Mahesh Poudya et al., Can
REDD+ Social Safeguards Reach the 'Right' People? Lessons from
Madagascar 37 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 31 (2016). Professor David Takacs has
noted that lack of specificity in the standards has made it difficult to monitor
compliance in implementation of projects. See David Takacs, Protecting Your
Environment, Exacerbating Injustice: Avoiding "Mandate Havens', 24 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 315, 348 (2014).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012) (requiring standards be set based on
providing an "adequate margin of safety... requisite to protect the public
health").
221. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(2)-(4) (2012) (providing a list of factors the EPA shall
consider, which omits economic, political, or even technological feasibility).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2012) (requiring standards be set based on
providing "an ample margin of safety to protect the public health").
223. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(c)(3) (2012) (requiring the EPA to "establish such
standards ... necessary to protect human health and the environment").
224. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring listing to be based solely on
"the best scientific and commercial data available").
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costs to a landowner, but instead focuses on the characteristics of the
resource, when it delineates wetlands.22 5
All of these actions impact the economy and have the potential to
impose particular burdens on the poor, but it is currently illegal for
implementing agencies to consider these impacts. Indeed, the only
available mechanism for considering costs is usually the takings clause,
which won't be triggered in most environmental protection situations and,
in any event, provides no special protection to the vulnerable.
There are a few notable exceptions in which U.S. law allows regulators
to consider burdens on vulnerable populations. One significant example is
the Endangered Species Act's allowance for Native Americans to take
endangered species primarily for subsistence purposes (and sometimes
religious purposes) without legal penalty or consequence. Indeed, Section
10 of the Endangered Species Act provides an explicit exemption for
Alaskan natives who take endangered species for subsistence use, 22 6 and
other allowances have been made on a case-by-case basis through a
variety of mechanisms including agency flexibility to set regulations when
a species is listed as threatened rather than endangered.2 27 Other
enactments related to the management of fisheries and whaling do much
the same. Yet, in the vast majority of instances (again absent a
constitutional taking of property), U.S. environmental law rarely provides
allowances for the pursuit of just environmentalism.
In pointing this out, we are not arguing that if law and institutions had
flexibility to consider costs and cost-distribution that they would naturally
incline toward a more just environmentalism. Indeed, in areas in which
agencies have some discretion, such as the enforcement of laws and the
setting of fines, the weight of the evidence suggests that the exercise of
that discretion often leads to a less just (rather than a more just)
225. While the definition of "waters of the United States" from the Clean Water
Act is much in dispute, regardless of how the term is defined, delineation
requires looking at the physical characteristics of hydrology, soil, and plant
life. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, RECOGNIZING WETLANDS (1998),
http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/Portals/46/docs/regulatory/docs/
recognizing-wetlands.pdf [http://perma.cc/S8ZV-PU3Z].
226. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (2012).
227. See Limitation on Section 9 Protections Applicable to Salmon and Steelhead
Listed as Threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), for Actions
Under Tribal Resource Management Plans, 65 Fed. Reg. 42,481 (July 10,




administration of the law.228 Without a more specific and considered
mandate about how that discretion should be exercised, it seems unlikely
that discretion to consider costs would lead to more just results.
Nonetheless, without at least some flexibility, in many instances the idea of
pursuing justice when justice and environmentalism collide is completely
off the table.
Moreover, it is not just the lack of flexibility in the administration of
environmental law that makes thinking about just environmentalism
difficult in the U.S. context; it is also the way that U.S. institutions are much
more entrenched and siloed off than those institutions we find in the
international context. As these situations illustrate, unless changed, U.S.
federal institutions and law would not allow for the kind of creativity
across policy boundaries that just environmentalism remedies might
require.
Of course, the fact that U.S. environmental law and institutions are not
very well designed to take into account just environmentalism does not
mean that the problems of justice environmentalism go unnoticed. Indeed,
as we have noted, a major theme of much of our political discourse
criticizing environmental protection focuses explicitly on the ways
environment protection can undermine job growth and livelihoods.
Making consideration of the harms of environmental protection a part of
environmental law-rather than just an objection that the "other side"
always invokes-might leave more space for holistic and collaborative
solutions that move both environmental protection and social justice
forward. There is little doubt, however, that effectively addressing these
concerns is likely to require legal and institutional reforms or, at least,
much more inter-agency collaboration than has typically occurred.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the environmental justice movement emerged nearly four
decades ago, we have generally conceived of environmental justice as
finding ways to promote environmental protection while simultaneously
helping society's most vulnerable. While much of the rhetoric of anti-
228. A classic environmental justice concern is the under-enforcement, or at least
less aggressive enforcement, of environmental protection laws in low-
income and minority neighborhoods. Fewer enforcement actions may be
brought against violators and those enforcement actions may result in lower
fines than for violations that occur in more affluent areas. See, e.g, Faber,
supra note 18, at 135.
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environmentalism has articulated the ways that environmental protection
produces social and economic harms, the environmental movement has
resisted conceding that this is the case.
The time has now come, if it is not long overdue, for the environmental
movement to grapple explicitly with those sets of cases where
environmental protection and protecting society's most vulnerable,
instead of going hand-in-hand, go head-to-head. This does not necessarily
mean foregoing or even reducing environmental protection. It will almost
certainly mean carefully considering these harms, attempting to avoid
them, and often mitigating them when they cannot reasonably be avoided.
Doing so will undoubtedly be difficult, but addressing these harms is
necessary to the advent of a more just environmentalism and may also be
the best hope for creating politics more receptive to environmental
protection in the long run.
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